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I. INTRODUCTION
So the emperor went along in the procession, under the splendid canopy, and
everyone in the streets said: "How beautiful the emperor's new clothes are!
What a splendid train! And how well they fit!" No one wanted to let it appear
that he could see nothing, for that would prove him not fit for his post. None
of the emperor's clothes had been so great a success before. "But he has noth-
ing on!" said a little child. "Just listen to the innocent," said the child's father.
And one person whispered to another what the child had said. "He has noth-
ing on. A child says he has nothing on!" "But he has nothing on," cried all the
people. The emperor was startled by this, for he had a suspicion that they
were right. But he thought, "I must face this out to the end and go on with the
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procession." So he held himself more stiffly than ever, and the chamberlains
held up the train that was not there at all. 1
In Hans Christian Andersen's classic fable, the emperor expended
all of his resources on new clothes, forsaking his governmental respon-
sibilities and the more noble pursuits of life. His obsession with new
attire made him susceptible to the tricks of two master weavers who
professed to make the most exquisite clothes imaginable. These char-
latans claimed their work was invisible only to fools. They tricked the
emperor into spending an extravagant sum of money on their wonder-
ful "clothes." The emperor's subjects raved about his new clothes,
which he displayed in a grand procession. Finally, one child, not
afraid to be considered foolish, exclaimed the truth that the emperor
was naked.2
This fable is being played out in American landlord and tenant
law. The Supreme Court of Alaska, a plurality of the Supreme Court
of California, and the Supreme Court of Michigan have recently as-
sumed the posture of the emperor.3 Forsaking higher principles like
protecting property rights, religious liberty and the sanctity of mar-
riage, these rulers have myopically pursued the goal of forcing unmar-
ried tenants on landlords who register a sincere religious objection to
the tenants' conduct. The three courts based their decisions primarily
on the premise that the state must stamp out all invidious discrimina-
tion, including, in this instance, "marital status" discrimination.4 Ac-
cording to the Alaska Supreme Court, the state has a governmental
interest in preventing discrimination "based on irrelevant characteris-
tics" that "degrades individuals, affronts human dignity, and limits
one's opportunities." 5 What rational person could possibly oppose
such a noble goal and support invidious discrimination? Like the em-
peror's procession, these rulers have proudly brought out their "new
1. Hans Christian Andersen, The Emperor's New Clothes, in THE BOOK OF VIRTUES
630, 633-34 (William J. Bennett ed., Simon & Schuster 1993)(1837).
2. See id.
3. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994);
Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996)(plurality
opinion); McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723 (Mich. 1998).
4. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 278-84 (Alaska
1994); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 914-31 (Cal.
1996)(plurality opinion); McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Mich. 1998).
5. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Alaska 1994);
see also Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 925 (Cal.
1996)(plurality opinion)(state must protect equal access to public accommoda-
tions and tenants' dignity interest in freedom from discrimination based on per-
sonal characteristics); McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Mich.
1998)(state's need to provide equal access to housing outweighs landlord's reli-
gious beliefs). This view was first articulated by a member of the Supreme Court
of Minnesota. See State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 16 (Minn. 1990)(Popovich, C.J.,
dissenting)(referring to the state's compelling interest in eliminating "invidious"
and "pernicious" discrimination against unmarried couples in housing).
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clothes" for all to see. Unlike the emperor, however, they have been
pleased to share the clothes with any subject who wants them. Not
surprisingly, many of the ruler's subjects have, with varying degrees
of enthusiasm, advocated or applauded this minority trend in the
law.6
As The Emperor's New Clothes teaches, the mere fact that numer-
ous people affirm a naked assertion does not make it true. It is often
difficult to disprove an idea that has gained a measure of acceptance,
particularly when those who have a political or personal interest in
the proposition espouse intricate theories in its support. So it is with
the notion that a landlord's refusal to rent to unmarried cohabitants
6. See Maureen E. Markey, The Landlord/Tenant Free Exercise Conflict in a Post-
RFRA World, 29 RUTGERS L.J. 487 (1998); Maureen E. Markey, The Price of
Landlord's "Free" Exercise of Religion: Tenant's Right to Discrimination-Free
Housing and Privacy, 22 FoRDHAAi URB. L.J. 699 (1995)[hereinafter Markey, The
Price]; Keirsten G. Anderson, Note, Protecting Unmarried Cohabitants from the
Religious Freedom Restoration Act, 31 VAL. U. L. REv. 1017 (1997); John C. Beat-
tie, Note, Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination: A Proposal for the Protec-
tion of Unmarried Couples, 42 HASTINGS L.J. 1415 (1991); Melissa Fishman
Cordish, Comment, A Proposal for the Reconciliation of Free Exercise Rights and
Anti-Discrimination Law, 43 UCLA L. REv. 2113 (1996); Kelly D. Eckel, Com-
ment, Legitimate Limitation of a Landlord's Rights-A New Dawn for Unmarried
Cohabitants, 68 TEmn'. L. REv. 811 (1995); Malgorzata (Margo) K. Laskowska,
Comment, "No Sinners Under My Roof: Can California Landlords Refuse to
Rent to Unmarried Couples by Claiming a Religious Freedom of Exercise Exemp-
tion from a Statute Which Prohibits Marital Status Discrimination?, 36 SANTA
CLARA L. REv. 219 (1995); Robert C. Mueller, Case Comment, Donahue v. Fair
Employment and Housing Commission: A Free Exercise Defense to Marital Sta-
tus Discrimination?, 74 B.U. L. REV. 145 (1994); Rita M. Neuman, Note, Closing
the Door on Cohabitants Under Wisconsin's Open Housing Law, 1995 Wis. L.
REv. 965 (1995); Matthew J. Smith, Comment, The Wages of Living in Sin: Dis-
crimination in Housing Against Unmarried Couples, 25 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 1055
(1992); Rebecca A- Wistner, Note, Cohabitation, Fornication and the Free Exercise
of Religion: Landlords Seeking Religious Exemption from Fair Housing Laws, 46
CASE W. REs. L. REv. 1071 (1996). A few commentators while not providing the
same analysis as this Article does, however, have declined to endorse this trend.
Most prominently, a Yale Law Professor has referred to the cases in which the
court has held that a religious landlord committed marital status discrimination
by refusing to rent to unmarried cohabitants as "terribly wrong and dangerous."
Stephen L. Carter, The Free Exercise Thereof, 38 Wivi. & MARY L. REv. 1627, 1650
(1997). The other dissenters include: James C. Geoly & Kevin R. Gustafson,
Religious Liberty and Fair Housing: Must A Landlord Rent Against His Con-
science?, 29 J. MARSHALL L. Rnv. 455 (1996); Scott A. Johnson, Note, The Conflict
Between Religious Exercise and Efforts to Eradicate Housing Discrimination
Against Nontraditional Couples: Should Free Exercise Protect Landlord Bias?, 53
WASH. & LEE L. REv. 351 (1996); George L. Opie, Note, The Free Exercise of Reli-
gion-State Court Devalues Landlords' Constitutional Rights: Attorney Gen. v.
Desilets, 20 S. ILL. U. L.J. 181 (1995); Peter M. Stein, Note, Smith v. Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Commission: Does the Right to Exclude, Combined With
Religious Freedom, Present a "Hybrid Situation" Under Employment Division v.
Smith?, 4 GEO. MASON L. REv. 141 (1995)(discussed at infra notes 244-57 and
accompanying text).
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constitutes marital status discrimination that cannot be excused even
when the landlord acts on a sincere religious belief. The proponents of
this new "right" for tenants have offered elaborate justifications for it,
and recent decisions of the highest courts in Alaska, California, and
Michigan show that these advocates have achieved a measure of suc-
cess, 7 although most courts that have addressed this issue do not
share their view.8
7. This success was significantly undermined recently by the Ninth Circuit's deci-
sion in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, Nos. 97-35220 & 97-35221,
1999 WL 11337 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999), an opinion that was released well after
this article was accepted for publication but shortly before it was published. In
Thomas, the court held that an Alaskan landlord who objected on religious
grounds to renting to unmarried couples was entitled, under the Federal Free
Exercise Clause, to an exemption from the Alaska fair housing law and a local
fair housing ordinance. See id. at *26. Thomas is discussed at several points in
sections IV.B and Part V supra. If Thomas remains the law in the Ninth Circuit,
religious landlords in Alaska, California and the other states within the Ninth
Circuit should be entitled to such exemptions as a matter of federal constitutional
law, notwithstanding the holdings in Swanner and Smith v. Fair Employment &
Housing Commission.
Massachusetts is the only jurisdiction other than Alaska, California and
Michigan in which it is established that a landlord who refuses to rent to unmar-
ried cohabitants commits marital status discrimination. See Attorney Gen. v.
Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994). However, in Desilets, the court remanded
and directed the state to grant the landlord a religious exemption unless it could
prove the exemption would lead to a housing shortage for cohabitants. See id. at
235; see also Worcester Hous. Auth. v. Massachusetts Comm'n Against Discrimi-
nation, 547 N.E.2d 43, 44-45 (Mass. 1989) (holding state statute prohibiting pub-
lic housing agents from withholding public accommodations because of marital
status was violated when couples were denied public housing benefits solely be-
cause they were unmarried). Only the Supreme Court of Alaska, a plurality of
the Supreme Court of California, and the Supreme Court of Michigan have abso-
lutely refused to grant the landlord a religious exemption in this type of case. A
panel of the Illinois Appellate Court recently adopted a similar position, but the
Illinois Supreme Court, without issuing an opinion, promptly vacated the deci-
sion. See Jasniowski v. Rushing, 678 N.E.2d 743 (ll. App. Ct. 1997), vacated, 685
N.E.2d 622 (Ill. 1997).
8. See generally Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, Nos. 97-35220 & 97-
35221, 1999 WL 11337 (9th Cir. Jan 14, 1999)(enforcement of city's antidis-
crimination laws against landlords who objected on religious grounds to renting
to unmarried couples violated the Free Exercise, Free Speech and Takings
Clauses of the U.S. constitution); Jasniowski v. Rushing, 685 N.E.2d 622 (ill.
1997)(vacating appellate court decision that held landlord was not entitled to a
religious exemption because universal enforcement of the prohibition against
marital status discrimination was the least restrictive means to eliminate such
discrimination); Mister v. A.R.K Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990)(landlord's refusal to rent to unmarried cohabitants was not marital status
discrimination); Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Greenbelt Homes,
Inc., 475 A.2d 1192 (Md. 1984)(cooperative housing development's policy against
cohabitation by unmarried couples was not marital status discrimination); Prince
George's County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 431 A.2d 745 (Md. Ct. Spec. App.
1981)(city ordinance prohibiting discrimination on basis of marital status did not
preclude enforcement of contract limiting occupancy to legally married couples);
[Vol. 77:494
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This Article explains why the "right" of unmarried cohabitants 9 to
force themselves and their sexual ethics on objecting religious land-
lords is as illusory as the emperor's new clothes.1O Part II demon-
strates why, under well-established principles of statutory
construction, the landlord's decision not to rent to an unmarried
couple cannot constitute marital status discrimination unless the leg-
islature has explicitly protected such couples. Because no statute cur-
rently provides this protection, landlords cannot presently commit
marital status discrimination by refusing to rent to unmarried
couples. Part III demonstrates that, even assuming these landlords
do commit marital status discrimination, a statute which protects un-
married couples is an invalid exercise of the state's police power if
there is no evidence that religiously-objecting landlords pose a suffi-
cient threat to the ability of unmarried couples to obtain suitable
housing. Part IV describes the numerous theories that landlords may
use to obtain strict scrutiny review of any law which proscribes dis-
crimination against unmarried couples. Part V analyzes the relative
interests of the landlord and the state under strict scrutiny review and
demonstrates that there are several reasons why a landlord who has a
sincere religious objection to the law should be entitled to an exemp-
tion. Part VI provides some final observations.
State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990)(landlord's refusal to rent to unmar-
ried cohabitants was not marital status discrimination); McFadden v. Elma
Country Club, 613 P.2d 146 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)(refusal to allow unmarried
couple to join a country club that included the privilege of property ownership in
the community was not marital status discrimination); County of Dane v. Nor-
man, 497 N.W.2d 714 (Wis. 1993)(landlord's refusal to rent to unmarried cohabi-
tants was not marital status discrimination). Cf Donahue v. Fair Employment &
Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766
(Cal. 1992), review dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993)(not published in official
reporter and cannot be cited in California)(although landlord's refusal to rent to
unmarried couple was marital status discrimination, landlord was entitled to a
religious exemption); Attorney Gen. v. Disilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass.
1994)(landlord's refusal to rent to unmarried couple was marital status discrimi-
nation, but on remand the state must establish that it has a compelling interest
that can only be satisfied by denying the landlord a religious exemption); Hudson
View Properties v. Weiss, 450 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y. 1983)(landlord could enforce a
provision restricting occupancy to tenant and immediate family notwithstanding
prohibition against marital status discrimination).
9. This Article only analyzes disputes involving unmarried heterosexual couples.
While many of the principles discussed in this Article will apply equally to cases
involving homosexual couples, such cases may also implicate gender and sexual
orientation issues that are beyond the scope of this Article.
10. Although this characterization may initially seem slanted in favor of the land-
lord's position, this Article will demonstrate that it accurately portrays the na-
ture of this landlord and tenant dispute. In any event, this characterization is
certainly no less objective than posing the issue as simply whether the state must
eradicate invidious discrimination.
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II. STATUTORY ANALYSIS
A. Current State Laws Regarding Marital Status
Discrimination and Unmarried Cohabitants
Because there is no federal legislation prohibiting marital status
discrimination, state and local law will govern disputes between land-
lords and unmarried couples.l There are currently no state laws that
explicitly protect unmarried cohabitants from discrimination in hous-
ing. However, some state statutes generally proscribe "marital sta-
tus" discrimination. The state laws governing landlord discretion in
selecting tenants fall within three general categories: (1) those which
do not prohibit marital status discrimination; (2) those which prohibit
marital status discrimination but explicitly allow landlords to exclude
unmarried cohabitants; and (3) those which prohibit marital status
discrimination but do not explicitly protect unmarried cohabitants. As
will be explained below, the first two approaches clearly offer unmar-
ried cohabitants no protection from landlords who do not wish to rent
to them. Although the third approach offers general protection from
marital status discrimination, landlords do not violate these laws by
refusing to rent to unmarried couples.
1. States Which Do Not Proscribe Marital Status Discrimination
Arkansas, Mississippi and Wyoming do not currently have a fair
housing law. In twenty-five other states, the state fair housing law
does not prohibit landlords from engaging in marital status discrimi-
nation. 12 There are two reasons why the common law will control in
these jurisdictions. First, the court must not presume that a statute is
designed to abrogate the common law fully unless the legislature
11. The Civil Rights Act of 1866 forbids racial discrimination in residential and com-
mercial leasing. See 42 U.S.C. § 1982 (1994). The Fair Housing Act of 1968 for-
bids, subject to certain exemptions, discrimination in renting based on "race,
color, religion, sex, familial status, or national origin." 42 U.S.C. §§ 3604(b), 3607
(1994).
12. See ALA. CODE § 24-8-4 (1992); ARiz. REV. STAT. ANN. § 41-1491.14 (West 1992);
FLA. STAT. ANN. § 760.23 (West 1997); GA. CODE ANN. § 8-3-202 (Harrison 1994);
IDAHO CODE § 67-5909 (1989); IND. CODE ANN. §§ 22-9.5-5-1 to -3 (Michie 1997);
IOwA CODE ANN. §§ 216.8 to .SA (West 1994 & Supp. 1998); KAN. STAT. ANN.
§ 44-1016 (1993); Ky. REV. STAT. ANN. § 344.360 (Banks-Baldwin 1997); LA. REV.
STAT. ANN. § 51:2606 (West Supp. 1998); ME. REV. STAT. ANN. tit. 5, § 4582 (West
Supp. 1997); Mo. ANN. STAT. § 213.040 (West 1996); NEV. REV. STAT. § 118.100
(1997); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 28-1-2 (Michie 1996); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 41A-4 (1990);
OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 4112.02(H) (Anderson Supp. 1998); OICLA. STAT. ANN. tit.
25, § 1452 (West Supp. 1998); PA. STAT. ANN. tit. 43, § 955(h) (West Supp. 1998);
S.C. CODE ANN. § 31-21-40 (Law Co-op. 1991); S.D. CODIFIED LAws § 20-13-20
(Michie 1995); TENN. CODE ANN. § 4-21-601 (Supp. 1997); TEX. PROP. CODE ANN.
§ 301.021 (West 1995); UTAH CODE ANN. § 57-21-5 (1994); VA. CODE ANN. § 36-
96.3 (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE § 5-11-9(6) (1994).
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clearly expressed its intent to do so.1 3 Second, under the statutory
construction maxim expressio unius est exclusio alterius, when a stat-
ute lists specific items, it is presumed that the legislature intended to
exclude all items not included.14 In jurisdictions that have fair hous-
ing laws, discrimination is commonly prohibited based on such charac-
teristics as race, national origin, religion, sex, and familial status. In
these states, it will therefore be presumed that the legislature inten-
tionally excluded other categories, such as marital status, from the
statute. Thus, in states that do not have a fair housing law or that
have a fair housing law that does not prohibit marital status discrimi-
nation, the common law will control.1 5
The common law gives landlords complete discretion in selecting
tenants. 16 Unlike inns, leased premises are not considered to provide
public accommodations. 17 An innkeeper has a duty to serve the public
without engaging in unreasonable discrimination.1 8 By contrast, a
lease involves a property transaction culminating in a conveyance of
an estate in land.19 Like other property transactions, the landlord
may choose freely with whom to do business. 20
Therefore, in these twenty-eight states, landlords have the abso-
lute right to exclude unmarried cohabitants.
13. See 2B NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION § 50.01, at
90 (5th ed. 1992).
14. See 2A NORMAN J. SINGER, STATUTES AND STATUTORY CONSTRUCTION §47.23, at
216-17 (5th ed. 1992).
15. The sole exception is Louisiana, which is not a common law state. However, the
Louisiana statute does not prohibit marital status discrimination or discrimina-
tion against unmarried cohabitants. See LA. REv. STAT. ANN. § 51:2606.A(1)
(West Supp. 1998). Therefore, Louisiana law does not prohibit landlords from
engaging in marital status discrimination.
16. See JOHN E. CRmBET & CORWIN W. JOHNSON, PRINCIPLES OF THE LAW OF PROP-
ERTY 241 (3d ed. 1989).
17. See id.
18. See id.
19. See id. at 235. The result of a lease is the landlord conveys a non-freehold estate
to the tenant and retains a reversion in fee simple absolute (assuming, of course,
the landlord had a fee simple to begin with). See ROGER A. CUNNINGHAM ET AL.,
THE LAW OF PROPERTY § 6.1, at 249-50 (2d ed. 1993). The non-freehold estate
entitles the tenant to the exclusive right of possession for the term of the lease.
See CRIBBEr & JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 235. Modern reforms have increas-
ingly emphasized contract principles to govern landlord and tenant law. See id.
at 235-36. Yet, the essential characteristics of a property transaction remain. See
id. (describing modern reforms of landlord and tenant law and the continuing
tension between property and contract principles). It is still true that the tenant
receives a non-freehold possessory estate from the transaction. See CUNNINGHAM
ET AL., supra, at 249-50. This estate is still characterized as at common law (e.g.,
a tenancy for years, periodic tenancy, or tenancy at will). See CIaBBET & JOHN-
SON, supra note 16, at 53-57.
20. See CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 241.
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2. Statutes Which Prohibit Marital Status Discrimination but
Explicitly Exclude Unmarried Cohabitants from
That Protection
Statutes in Connecticut and Oregon prohibit marital status dis-
crimination generally but explicitly do not protect unmarried
couples. 2 1 In Connecticut, the prohibition against marital status dis-
crimination "shall not be construed to prohibit the denial of a dwelling
to a man or a woman who are both unrelated by blood and not married
to each other."2 2 In Oregon, the prohibition against marital status
discrimination does not apply to cases that "would necessarily result
in common use of bath or bedroom facilities by unrelated persons of
opposite sex."23 The Oregon Attorney General has interpreted this
provision to allow a landlord to refuse to rent to an unmarried
couple.2 4 Thus, in these two states, landlords may exclude unmarried
cohabitants without committing marital status discrimination.
3. Statutes Which Generally Proscribe Marital Status
Discrimination But Do Not Specifically Protect
Unmarried Cohabitants
In the remaining twenty states and the District of Columbia, stat-
utes proscribe marital status discrimination but do not explicitly pro-
tect unmarried cohabitants. These statutes are of two types: those
that define "marital status," and those that do not.
a. Statutes Which Do Not Define "Marital Status"
Seventeen states have statutes that proscibe marital status dis-
crimination in housing transactions but do not define "marital sta-
tus."25 None of these statutes explicitly protects unmarried couples.2 6
21. See CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64c(b)(2) (West 1995); OR. REV. STAT.
§ 659.033(6) (1997). See generally Smith, supra note 6, at 1075.
22. CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN. § 46a-64c(b)(2) (West 1995).
23. OR. REV. STAT. § 659.033(6) (1997).
24. See 38 Op. Or. Att'y Gen. 181 (1976).
25. See ALASKA STAT. § 18.80.240 (Michie 1996); CAL. GOV'T CODE § 12955 (West
Supp. 1998); COLO. REV. STAT. § 24-34-502 (1996); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6, § 4603
(1993); HAW. REV. STAT. § 515-3 (1993); MASS. GEN. LAWs ANN. ch. 151B, § 4.6
(West Supp. 1998); MICH. Comp. LAws ANN. § 37.2502.502 (West Supp. 1998);
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-305 (1998); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 354-A-10 (Supp.
1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 10:5-12(g)-(h) (West Supp. 1998); N.Y. ExEc. LAW
§ 296(5)(a)(1) (McKinney 1998); N.D. CENT. CODE ANN. § 14-02.4-12 (Supp.
1997)("status with respect to marriage"); R.I. GEN. LAWs § 34-37-4 (Supp. 1997);
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 9, § 4503 (1993); WASH. REV. CODE ANN. § 49.60.222(1) (West
Supp. 1998); Wis. STAT. ANN. § 106.04 [1], [1 m(h)], [2] (West 1997). The Ne-
braska legislature has authorized localities to prevent marital status discrimina-
tion in public accommodation and housing. See NEB. REV. STAT. § 18-1724 (1997).
26. There also may be local ordinances that regulate a landlord's discretion in select-
ing tenants. See CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 16. Although describing all rele-
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Therefore, courts in these jurisdictions must apply principles of statu-
tory construction to determine whether the legislature intended to
provide such protection.
A court must construe undefined words and phrases in light of
their ordinary meaning and the common law principles that govern
them.27 This principle of statutory construction controls because the
legislature is presumed to know the ordinary and accepted meaning of
words and to intend that meaning when such words or phrases are
used without definition. Black's Law Dictionary defines "marital" as
"[rielating to, or connected with, the status of marriage ....- 28
Although "status" is therefore redundant, it is defined as "[tlhe legal
character or condition of a person or thing."29 Because "marital sta-
tus" accordingly means the legal character or condition of a person
relating to marriage, the law of marriage will determine whether co-
habitants enjoy a unique marital status.
The common law defined marriage as a permanent, monogamous
relationship between a man and a woman.30 This definition naturally
begs the question of how a man and woman may achieve the status of
marriage. In England, ecclesiastical courts originally adjudicated
marital issues.3 1 Because the United States has not had a national
church or ecclesiastical courts, marriage has been regulated under
American equity jurisdiction.3 2 Facing the expanse of the American
frontier and the frequent unavailability of a clergyman or civil officer
to perform a marriage ceremony, the American colonies and early
states generally accepted informal marriage. 33 This informal mar-
vant local ordinances would be a daunting task and is beyond the scope of this
Article, two observations about such ordinances are warranted. First, the analy-
sis in this section will apply equally to any ordinance that forbids marital status
discrimination. Second, when considering local ordinances, the court must ad-
dress the additional issue of whether, under established principles of municipal
law, the locality is authorized to adopt the ordinance and whether the ordinance
is consistent with state law and public policy. See, e.g., County of Dane v. Nor-
man, 497 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Wis. 1993) (invalidating an ordinance that explicitly
forbade discrimination against "cohabitants").
27. See SINGEa, supra note 13, § 50.03, at 103-04. A court may also consult the appli-
cable legislative history to see if it provides insight into how the legislature in-
tended the courts to interpret such phrases. See id. § 47.28, at 248-49. It is
beyond the scope of this Article to parse through the intricate details of the legis-
lative history of all state fair housing laws. The following discussion assumes
that the legislative history does not clearly establish how a court is to define
"marital status."
28. BLAcK's LAw Dic'ToNARY 967 (6th ed. 1990).
29. WEBsT K's II NEw RIVESLmE UNrvERsrrY DIcTIoNARY 1134 (1984).
30. See HOMER H. CLARK, JR., I THE LAW OF DO MESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES § 2.1, at 72 (2d practitioner's ed. 1987).
31. See id. at 69-71.
32. See id. at 72, 75.
33. See id at 70-71.
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riage, eventually known as "common law marriage," was based on two
types of informal marriage recognized by the English ecclesiastical
courts,3 4 both of which involved a binding agreement between a man
and woman to become husband and wife.35
Contrary to common misunderstanding, mere cohabitation, how-
ever long-standing, between a man and woman has never alone estab-
lished a common law marriage. Rather, the mutual agreement of the
man and woman to assume a marital relationship forms the founda-
tion for a common law marriage.3 6 The couple must also hold them-
selves out as married.3 7 The additional requirement of cohabitation
provides an objective basis for proving the mutual agreement to
marry.38 Although evidence of cohabitation may create an inference
of an agreement to marry, such evidence alone cannot prove the exist-
ence of a common law marriage.3 9 Thus, the common modem practice
of living together either in lieu of marriage or as a test to see if mar-
riage is desirable cannot, without more, establish a legally recognized
common law marriage.
Eventually, the states began to adopt licensing and solemnization
requirements and other forms of marriage regulation.40 As these re-
quirements were adopted, common law marriage came into increasing
disfavor. Today, only thirteen states and the District of Columbia rec-
ognize common law marriages.4 1
The history of marriage law therefore shows that unmarried co-
habitants do not, by virtue of cohabitation alone, have a unique mari-
tal status. They simply constitute an unmarried couple, composed of
two single people. "While each [cohabitant] separately ha[s] a marital
status, collectively they d[o] not. Only marriage as prescribed by law
can change the marital status of an individual to a new legal entity of
husband and wife."4 2 The common law has never recognized a distinct
marital status of "cohabitant."
The principle that a court must not interpret a statute in a way
that leads to an absurd result further bolsters this conclusion.4 3 Cre-
34. See id. § 2.4, at 100.
35. See id. § 2.1, at 69-70.
36. See id. §2.4, at 104-05.
37. See id. at 105.
38. See id.
39. See id. at 108.
40. See id. § 2.3, at 85-97, § 2.4, at 101-03.
41. See id. § 2.4, at 101-04; see also HOMER H. CLAr, JR. & CAROL GLOWINSKY,
CASES AND PROBLEMS ON DOMESTIC RELATIONS 95 (5th ed. 1995). The states are
Alabama, Colorado, Georgia, Idaho, Iowa, Kansas, Montana, Oklahoma, Penn-
sylvania, Rhode Island, South Carolina, Texas, and Utah.
42. Prince George's County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 431 A.2d 745, 748 (Md. Ct.
Spec. App. 1981); see also Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Greenbelt
Homes, Inc., 475 A.2d 1192, 1197 (Md. 1984).
43. See SINGER, supra note 14, § 46.07, at 126.
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ating a marital status of cohabitant would lead to married couples
having two marital statuses. To cohabit means to live together as
husband and wife and also to live together in a sexual relationship
when not legally married.4 4 Thus, both married and unmarried
couples who live together in a sexual relationship are cohabitants. A
court should not adopt an interpretation that leads to the patent ab-
surdity of married couples having the status of both "married" and
"cohabitant."
Therefore, in jurisdictions where the statute proscribes marital
status discrimination but does not define the operative phrase, cohabi-
tants are not protected as a distinct marital status. 45
b. Statutes Which Define "Marital Status"
In Illinois, Maryland, Minnesota and the District of Columbia,
statutes prohibit marital status discrimination and define "marital
status" as being either married, single, divorced, separated, or wid-
owed.4 6 These statutes plainly do not treat cohabitants as having a
distinct marital status. In these states, as in the jurisdictions that do
not define "marital status," the fair housing law does not protect un-
married couples as having a distinct marital status.4 7
44. See WEBSTER'S II NEw RrvExsIDE UNIvsrIY DICTIONARY 279 (1984); see also
BLACes LAw DICTIONARY 260 (6th ed. 1990)(defining "cohabitation" as "[t]o live
together as husband and wife").
45. Even some critics of traditional marriage acknowledge that unmarried cohabi-
tants do not have a distinct marital status. For example, one writer has urged
the creation of a new legal status of "lawful" or "common law" cohabitation,
whereby unmarried couples could register their relationship with the state and
thereby receive benefits traditionally given only to spouses. See William A.
Reppy, Jr., Property and Support Rights of Unmarried Cohabitants: A Proposal
for Creating a New Legal Status, 44 LA. L. REv. 1677, 1678 (1984).
46. See D.C. CODE ANN. §§ 1-2501, 2502(17) (1992); 775 ILL. CoMP. STAT. 5/1-102(A),
103(lM(West Supp. 1998); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §§ 19(a), 20(n) (1994); Mmi.
STAT. ANN. §§ 363.01.24, 363.03.2(1)(a) (West 1991).
47. The courts in Illinois, Maryland and Minnesota have so held. See Jasniowski v.
Rushing, 685 N.E.2d 622 (Ill. 1997)(vacating without opinion the appellate
court's holding that landlord's refusal to rent to unmarried cohabitants was mari-
tal status discrimination); Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1159
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990)(landlords refusal to rent to unmarried cohabitants was not
marital status discrimination); Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Green-
belt Homes, Inc., 475 A.2d 1192, 1196-98 (Md. 1984)(cooperative housing develop-
ment's policy against cohabitation by unmarried couples was not marital status
discrimination); Prince George's County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 431 A.2d 745,
747-49 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)(policy against cohabitation was not marital sta-
tus discrimination); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4-8 (Minn. 1990)(landlord's
refusal to rent to unmarried cohabitants was not marital status discrimination).
As of this writing, there has been no reported decision on this issue in the District
of Columbia.
1998]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
Some conclusions are clear from the preceding discussion. In the
thirty states that fall within the first two categories discussed above,48
unmarried couples have no basis upon which to challenge a landlord's
decision not to rent to them because they are not married. In the
twenty-one jurisdictions that have laws generally proscribing marital
status discrimination, unmarried couples do not have a distinct mari-
tal status and thus are not protected, as a class, from discrimination.
In these twenty-one jurisdictions, if religious landlords commit mari-
tal status discrimination by not renting to these couples, it can only be
because the landlords somehow discriminate against single people. As
the next section explains, landlords do not discriminate against single
people when they decide not to rent to unmarried couples.
B. The Fundamental Issue: Does a Landlord Discriminate
Against Single Individuals by Not Renting to
Unmarried Couples?
Although cohabitants do not have a unique marital status, the
highest courts in Alaska, California, Massachusetts and Michigan
have nevertheless held that landlords who will not rent to unmarried
cohabitants discriminate on the basis of marital status. 49 These
courts have reached this conclusion primarily for two reasons. First,
even though the statute does not protect unmarried couples as a class,
the landlord has supposedly discriminated against the prospective
tenants because they are single. Second, because the statutes in those
states forbid discrimination against persons as well as individuals, it
is presumed that the legislature intended to protect unmarried
couples. Although superficially appealing, neither argument with-
stands careful analysis.
1. Purported Discrimination Against Single Tenants and the
Status ! Conduct Distinction
In several cases in which a landlord has decided on religious
grounds not to rent to an unmarried couple, the landlord has explicitly
objected to fornication and/or cohabitation.5 0 Because fornication and
48. See supra notes 11-23 and accompanying text.
49. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 278 (Alaska
1994); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 914-15 (Cal.
1996)(plurality opinion); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Mass.
1994); McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Mich. 1998).
50. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 278 (Alaska
1994); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 914-15 (Cal.
1996)(plurality opinion); Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1156
(Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Mass. 1994);
McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 725-27 (Mich. 1998); State v. French, 460
N.W.2d 2, 3-4 (Minn. 1990); County of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714, 714
(Wis. 1993).
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cohabitation involve conduct, these landlords have argued that they
have discriminated, if at all, on the basis of conduct and not status.5 1
Although some courts have accepted this argument,5 2 others have
rejected it,53 relying on the following tidy syllogism. The landlord
would not object if married couple "A" lived on the premises and had
sex, and yet the landlord objects to unmarried couple "B" doing pre-
cisely the same thing. Because couple A and couple B will engage in
the same conduct--cohabitation and sexual intercourse-on the prem-
ises, the only difference between the two couples is that one is married
and the other is not. Thus, the reasoning goes, the landlord discrimi-
nates against single people.5 4 The assumption in the syllogism that
"sex is sex," however, is fundamentally flawed and contrary to com-
mon sense and experience.
The fatal flaw in this assumption can be shown through a series of
illustrations. Assume there are two couples, A and B. Couple A is
composed of a male and a female, Al and A2, and couple B likewise is
composed of a male and a female, B1 and B2. Couple A is married,
lives in an apartment together, and has consensual marital sex on the
premises. Couple B rents an apartment in the same complex and like-
wise engages in sex on the premises. Contrary to the "all sex is the
same" assumption made by some courts, couple A and couple B only
engage in objectively identical behavior if couple B is married and the
conduct is consensual.
For example, if B2 is mentally impaired or for some other reason
does not willingly consent to having sex with B1, then that sex is rape.
If B1 or B2 is married to someone else, then couple B is committing
adultery. If B2 is fourteen years old, then even if she willingly en-
gages in sex with B1, he commits statutory rape, a pedophilic act. If
B2 is dead when the sex act is committed, Bl's behavior is criminal
and necrophilic. If B2 is a ewe, B's behavior is bestial. Likewise, if
B1 and B2 are unmarried, they commit fornication, which is "sexual
51. See, e.g., Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1156-59 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990); McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 726-27 (Mich. 1998); State v.
French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 4-6 (Minn. 1990); County of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d
714, 714-18 (Wis. 1993).
52. See Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); State v.
French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn. 1990); County of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714
(Wis. 1993).
53. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994);
Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996)(plurality
opinion); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994); McCready v.
Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723 (Mich. 1998).
54. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 278 (Alaska
1994); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 915 (Cal.
1996)(plurality opinion); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Mass.
1994); McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 726-27 (Mich. 1998).
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intercourse between a man and woman not married to each other,"55
when they engage in that behavior on the premises. Married couple A
cannot, by definition, engage in fornication. The courts that have
ruled against the landlord have missed the basic point that only un-
married couples can engage in fornication.
On a purely anatomical level, the conduct of couple B in these illus-
trations (other than the extreme example involving the ewe) is the
same as that of married couple A. But these illustrations show that
the different status of each couple makes their conduct fundamentally
different. This is true whether or not a statute proscribes fornication.
For example, if B1 is married to C, then B1 and B2 in fact commit
adultery when they have sexual intercourse on the premises regard-
less of whether adultery is a crime. Likewise, even if the state has
decriminalized fornication, if B1 and B2 are not married, they are for-
nicating on the premises and their behavior is fundamentally different
than that of couple A.
To further illustrate that the presumption that "all sex is equal" is
fallacious, assume that couple B, like couple A, is married. Assume
also that Al and B2 decide to rent an apartment to facilitate their
affair. Although the landlord clearly would not object to renting an
apartment to couple A or to couple B, the landlord objects to renting to
Al and B2. Has the landlord committed marital status discrimina-
tion? The landlord is certainly not discriminating against single peo-
ple because both Al and B2 are married. Likewise, the landlord is not
discriminating against married people because he would readily rent
the apartment to either married couple. The prospective tenants may
object that the landlord is discriminating against people living to-
gether and having sex when they are not married, but that is precisely
the point. This landlord does not discriminate against married or sin-
gle people but simply objects to the conduct of this couple. Any court
that disagrees is clearly more concerned with imposing a permissive
moral standard than with eliminating "invidious" discrimination
based on immutable characteristics.56 If the state does not prohibit
fornication or adultery, couples may lawfully engage in that behavior,
but they have no right to do so on the landlord's property.
It is illogical and indefensible to assert that a landlord discrimi-
nates on the basis of marital status discrimination by not renting to
an unmarried couple. The landlord simply objects to, and discrimi-
nates on the basis of, the prospective tenants' conduct.5 7 Instead of
55. WEBSTER'S II NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERSITY DICTIONARY 499 (1984).
56. See, e.g., infra notes 416-19 and accompanying text (describing one judge's ex-
plicit statements to this effect).
57. See County of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714, 717 (Wis. 1993). It should be
noted, however, that not all forms of discrimination are wrong. The verb "to dis-
criminate" has two meanings: (1) to differentiate; and (2) to act on the basis of
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treating people differently due to their status, these landlords apply
the same standard to people of all marital statuses. The landlord will
not rent to anyone, whether single, married, separated, divorced, or
widowed, who intends to have sex outside of marriage on the prem-
ises. Unless the state makes it illegal to discriminate against tenants
because they engage in non-marital sex, a questionable state action at
best, the landlord is free to exclude tenants on this basis.
2. Statutes Prohibiting Marital Status Discrimination
Against "Persons"
The courts that have ruled against the landlord have done so also
because the applicable statute makes it illegal to discriminate against
persons based on their marital status. These courts reason that the
plural form of "person" reflects legislative intent to protect couples in
addition to individuals.58 Of course, this rationale cannot be applied if
the statute does not include the plural form of "person."59 Currently,
statutes in seventeen states prohibit marital status discrimination
against "persons" in housing transactions. 60
prejudice. See WEBSTER'S IT NEW RIVERSIDE UNIvERsITY DICTIONARY 385 (1984).
In this case, the landlord is simply differentiating based on fundamentally differ-
ent conduct.
58. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 278 (Alaska
1994); Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199, 1201-02
(Alaska 1989); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 914-15
(Cal. 1996)(plurality opinion); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235
(Mass. 1994); Worcester Hous. Auth. v. Mass. Comm'n Against Discrimination,
547 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Mass. 1989).
59. See, e.g., State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 6 (Minn. 1990)(by referring to a person,
"the legislature intended to address only the status of an individual, not an indi-
vidual's relationship with... a domestic partner").
60. Of the jurisdictions in which marital status discrimination is proscribed in lease
transactions, statutes in five states expressly prohibit marital status discrimina-
tion against "persons." See MAss. GEN. LAws ch. 151B, § 4 (1996); MmN. STAT.
§363.03 (Supp. 1997); N.J. STAT. ANN. §10:5-12 (West Supp. 1998); N.Y. ExEc.
LAw §296(5) (McKinney 1993); Wis. STAT. §106.04 (1995-96). Statutes in twelve
other of these states protect a "person" or "person residing with that person," but
define "person" in its plural form. See ALAsKA STAT. §§ 18.80.240, 18.80.300(11)
(1996) (person defined as "one or more individuals"); CAL. Gov'T CODE §§ 12927(f),
12955 (West Supp. 1998)(defined as "all individuals"); CoLo. REv. STAT. §§ 24-34-
301(5) to -502 (1997)(defined as "one or more individuals"); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6,
§§ 4602(19), 4603 (1993)(defined as "one or more individuals"); HAw. Rsv. STAT.
§§ 1-19, 515-3 (1993)(defined as "individuals"); 755 ILL. Comp. STAT. 5/3-102, 5/1-
103(L) (West 1996)(defined as "one or more individuals"); MD. ANN. CODE art.
49B, §§ 20, 22 (1994)(defined as "one or more individuals"); MICH. STAT. ANN.
§ 3.548(502) (Law Co-op 1996)("person or person residing with that person");
MONT. CODE ANN. § 49-2-101, -305(1)(b) (1997)(defined as "one or more individu-
als"); N.H. REv. STAT. ANN. §§ 354-2, A:10 (1995 & Supp. 1997)(defined as "one
or more individuals"); R.I. GEN. LAws §§ 34-37-3, -4 (Supp. 1997)(defined as "one
or more individuals"); WAsH. REV. CODE §§ 49.60.040(1), 49.60.222 (Supp.
1997)(defined as "one or more individuals").
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Even if a statute protects "persons" from marital status discrimi-
nation, there are two flaws in the assumption that this word inher-
ently protects unmarried cohabitants. First, as we have just seen, the
underlying premise that the landlord discriminates on the basis of sta-
tus and not conduct is false.
Second, it is not necessarily true that, by using the word "persons,"
the legislature intended to protect couples. Each statute must be con-
strued according to its own history and wording, and the text of the
statute and legislative history may reveal legislative intent to protect
couples. However, by referring to "persons," the legislature may sim-
ply intend to protect more than one person from a specific act of dis-
crimination, and not necessarily to protect couples per se. For
example, in Zahorian v. Russell Fitt Real Estate Agency,61 a landlord
was accused of marital status discrimination for refusing to rent an
apartment to two unmarried female friends. The New Jersey legisla-
ture had amended the state fair housing law in 1970 to prohibit a real
estate broker from refusing a rental to any "person or group of per-
sons" because of marital status.6 2 In upholding a judgment against
the landlord, the court noted that the legislature intended to protect
two or more persons "of the same sex who constituted themselves into
a housekeeping unit."63 Zahorian illustrates that legislative use of
the term "persons" does not necessarily indicate intent to protect un-
married cohabitants.
There is no legitimate basis under existing law to conclude that a
landlord who excludes unmarried cohabitants commits marital status
discrimination. If a legislature desires to protect unmarried cohabi-
tants, it must indicate so clearly-a relatively simple task.64 Unless
and until the legislature enacts such legislation, the courts have no
legitimate basis upon which to rule for the tenants in these disputes. 65
C. Public Policy Issues
Even if a current state statute could be properly interpreted to pro-
tect unmarried cohabitants from marital status discrimination, there
are sound public policy reasons why a court should not presume legis-
lative intent to do so.
61. 301 A.2d 754 (N.J. 1973).
62. Id. at 757.
63. Id.
64. See, e.g., County of Dane v. Norman, 497 N.W.2d 714, 715 (Wis. 1993)(dispute
involving an ordinance which listed "cohabitant" as a marital status).
65. Even if the legislature enacts such explicit legislation, it may properly do so only
if circumstances justify such an exercise of the state's police power. See infra
Part III.
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1. Promotion of Marriage
A court should construe the law to further the policy of promoting
the institution of marriage. The United States Supreme Court has
recognized that "[m]arriage... creat[es] the most important relation
in life... [and] ha[s] more to do with the morals and civilization of a
people than any other institution. . . ."66 Moreover, the court charac-
terized marriage as "an institution, in the maintenance of which in its
purity the public is deeply interested, for it is the foundation of the
family and of society, without which there would be neither civiliza-
tion nor progress."67
Treating unmarried cohabitation as equivalent to marriage de-
grades the institution of marriage.68 The requirement of more than
cohabitation to establish a marital relationship, 69 and the benefits
given to spouses that are not given to unmarried couples, 70 demon-
strate the state's interest in protecting the institution of marriage.
Although the state may have defensible reasons to decriminalize illicit
cohabitation, there is no apparent reason to protect and support it, at
least not in the absence of a transition to a completely libertarian
society.
There are certain moral values and institutions that have served western civi-
lization well for eons .... Before abandoning fundamental values and institu-
tions, we must pause and take stock of our present social order: millions of
drug abusers; rampant child abuse; a rising underclass without marketable
job skills; children roaming the streets; children with only one parent or no
parent at all; and children growing up with no one to guide them in developing
any set of values .... How can we expect anything else when the state itself
contributes, by arguments [that landlords who exclude unmarried cohabitants
must be prosecuted], to the further erosion of fundamental institutions that
have formed the foundation of our civilization for centuries? 7 1
Unfortunately, the courts that have punished religious landlords
for excluding unmarried couples have inexplicably abandoned their
traditional support of marriage in favor of sanctioning informal sexual
unions.
66. Maynard v. Hill, 125 U.S. 190, 205 (1888).
67. Id. at 211.
68. See Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 475 A.2d
1192, 1197 (Md. 1984).
69. See supra notes 30-42 and accompanying text.
70. See, e.g., infra note 384 and accompanying text.
71. State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 11 (Minn. 1990); see also County of Dane v. Nor-
man, 497 N.W.2d 714, 716 (Wis. 1993)(requiring landlords to rent to unmarried
cohabitants "is inconsistent with the public policy of this state which seeks to
promote the stability of marriage and family").
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2. Existing Prohibitions Against Fornication and Cohabitation
Several jurisdictions criminalize either fornication or unmarried
cohabitation or both.72 In these jurisdictions, the court cannot prop-
erly interpret a fair housing law to protect conduct that the state
criminalizes. Several courts have ruled for the landlord in part be-
cause a fornication or cohabitation statute reflected the state's policy
of discouraging such behavior.73 Even if the legislature subsequently
repealed the fornication and cohabitation statutes, the fact that such a
statute existed when the marital status provision was enacted demon-
strates that the legislature could not have intended to protect unmar-
ried couples. 74 When interpreting a statute, the court must determine
72. In those states that prohibit marital status discrimination, three have statutes
that criminalize fornication. See 720 ILL. Comp. STAT. 5/11-8 (West 1996); MASs.
GEN. LAws ch. 272, § 18 (1996); MINN. STAT. § 609.34 (1996). One has a statute
that criminalizes unmarried cohabitation. See MICH. STAT. ANN. § 28.567 (Law
Co-op 1990). Of the states that have fair housing laws that do not prohibit mari-
tal status discrimination, nine have statutes that criminalize fornication. See GA.
CODE ANN. § 16-6-18 (1996); IDAHO CODE § 18-6603 (1997); Miss. CODE ANN. § 97-
29-1 (1994); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 14-184 (1993); N.D. CENr. CODE § 12.1-20-08
(1997); S.C. CODE ANN. § 16-15-60 (Law. Co-op. 1985); UTAH CODE ANN. § 76-7-
104 (1995); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-344 (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-3 (1997).
In Pennsylvania, any person who maintains a building or part of a building used
for the purposes of fornication shall be guilty of a misdemeanor. See PA. STAT.
ANN. tit. 68, § 467 (West 1994). Of those states that do not prohibit marital sta-
tus discrimination, seven also criminalize unmarried cohabitation. See ARiz.
REV. STAT. ANN. § 13-1409 (West 1989); FLA. STAT. ch. 789.02 (1997); Miss. CODE
ANN. § 97-29-1 (1994); N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-10-2 (Michie 1994); N.D. CENT. CODE
§ 12.1-20-10 (1997); VA. CODE ANN. § 18.2-345 (Michie 1996); W. VA. CODE § 61-8-
4 (1997). These statutory prohibitions preserve the common law prescription
against sex outside of legal marriage. See CLARK, supra note 30, § 2.1, at 72 (not-
ing that at common law sexual relations were only permitted between husband
and wife). The definition of "illicit cohabitation" demonstrates this point:
The living together as man and wife of two persons who are not lawfully
married, with the implication that they habitually practice fornication.
At common law and by statutes in many states, living together either in
adultery or fornication is a crime, though at common law such cohabita-
tion had to be open and notorious so as to cause a public scandal ....
BLAces LAw DICTIONARY 748 (6th ed. 1990).
73. See Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1157 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990);
State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 5-7 (Minn. 1990); McFadden v. Elma Country
Club, 613 P.2d 146, 150-51 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980). Cf. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets,
636 N.E.2d 233, 240 (Mass. 1994)(noting that, although the Massachusetts forni-
cation statute was of "doubtful constitutionality" in some contexts, the statute
undermined the state's argument that it had a compelling interest in forcing
landlords to rent to unmarried cohabitants). But see McCready v. Hoffius, 586
N.W.2d 723, 727-28 (Mich. 1998)(summarily dismissing argument that unmar-
ried cohabitants would engage in "lewd and lascivious conduct" without defining
that phrase).
74. See Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 533 N.E.2d 1152, 1157-58 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990)(holding that statute did not protect unmarried cohabitants even though
the legislature subsequently decriminalized cohabitation); McFadden v. Elma
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what the legislature intended the statute to mean when it was
adopted.75 It is inappropriate for the court to reword a statute due to
subsequent events or the court's own preferences. 76 If fornication or
cohabitation was illegal at the time the legislature proscribed marital
status discrimination in housing, then it must be presumed that the
legislature did not intend the fair housing law to protect couples who
engage in such conduct.
3. The Effect of the Repeal of Fornication and Cohabitation
Statutes
Even in states where fornication and cohabitation are not illegal,
no legislature has ever expressed an interest in promoting or protect-
ing such behavior.7 7 Some courts have suggested that the legisla-
ture's decision to repeal the fornication and cohabitation statutes
indicates the intent to protect such conduct. 7s The assumption that
the state must either fully condemn or support certain behavior is de-
monstrably false. Criminalizing particular conduct certainly reflects
state disapproval. However, decriminalizing the same conduct may
simply reflect that the state no longer desires to prosecute it. For ex-
ample, even though many states have repealed statutes that criminal-
ized adultery, it would be indefensible to suggest that the repeal
necessarily indicates state support and promotion of adultery. Simi-
larly, the fact that the state prosecutes people for lying only in limited
Country Club, 613 P.2d 146, 150 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)("The existence of the ille-
gal cohabitation statute for 3 years after the amendment of [the anti-discrimina-
tion statute] would seem to vitiate any argument that the legislature intended
'marital status' discrimination to include discrimination on the basis of a couple's
unwed cohabitation.").
75. See SINGER, supra note 14, § 45.05, at 22-23.
76. See id. In Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199 (Alaska
1989), the Supreme Court of Alaska overlooked these canons of statutory con-
struction. In 1975, the Alaska legislature adopted a statute that prohibited mari-
tal status discrimination in housing. In 1978, the legislature repealed the statute
that made it a crime for unmarried couples to live together. The court in Fore-
man held that "it would be manifestly unreasonable to limit the effect of [the
marital status provision] by reference to an outdated criminal statute which was
[subsequently] repealed." Id. at 1202. The court ignored that its task was to dis-
cern the legislature's intent when the statute was enacted, not what the legisla-
ture might have intended at some later point. Also, if the legislature intended to
protect cohabitants, it could have easily amended the fair housing law to provide
such protection explicitly, just as it amended the criminal code by abolishing the
statute that prohibited illicit cohabitation.
77. See McFadden v. Elma Country Club, 613 P.2d 146, 152 (Wash. Ct. App.
1980)("[W]e can perceive no public policy for protection of [unmarried cohabita-
tion] even though it appears to be more widely tolerated than in the past.").
78. See, e.g., Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779 P.2d 1199, 1202
(Alaska 1989); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 917-18
(Cal. 1996)(plurality opinion); Jasniowski v. Rushing, 678 N.E.2d 743, 747 (m.
App. Ct. 1997), vacated, 685 N.E.2d 622 (Ill. 1997).
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circumstances (e.g., perjury, false tax returns, etc.) does not suggest
state promotion of lying in all other contexts.
The legislature's repeal of the fornication and cohabitation statutes
can at most be presumed to indicate that the state desires neither to
condemn nor to promote such conduct.
Such a stance expresses neither approval nor disapproval of discreet cohabita-
tion; couples who wish to live together without being married can certainly
still do so, but they must find a landlord who does not object to the arrange-
ment .... This position is entirely consistent with the State's dichotomous
public policy on cohabitation, which is to respect "purely private relationships"
without debasing "public morality."
.. [The legislature was not limited to either outlawing such practices or
affording them a protected status under the law. A vast middle ground exists
wherein such conduct might be neither prohibited by the State nor protected
from private disapprobation.7 9
There is, in short, no sound basis for courts to rule that any current
state fair housing law prohibits landlords from excluding unmarried
couples. Unless and until a state legislature explicitly protects such
couples in housing transactions, landlords should be free to decide not
to rent to them.8 0
III. POLICE POWER ISSUES
A. An Overview of the Principles Governing the State's
Police Power
Even if a statute explicitly protects unmarried couples from dis-
crimination in the rental housing market, the statute is not valid un-
less the state was justified in exercising its police power to enact it. In
the post-New Deal era, courts and commentators have often assumed
that the state can regulate virtually at whim. Even under the current
view of the state's police power, this assumption is not true. There are
well-established, necessary limits on the state's police power. In this
79. Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1158 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990)(citation
omitted).
80. The statutory construction principle that remedial statutes are generally to be
construed liberally does not contradict this conclusion. There are two reasons
why this is so. First, this principle does not apply to statutes in derogation of the
common law; such statutes must be strictly construed. See SINGER, supra note
13, §60.01, at 148. Statutes proscribing marital status discrimination in leasing
alter the common law rule which gives landlords absolute discretion in selecting
tenants. See supra notes 16-20 and accompanying text. Second, the principle of
liberal construction of remedial statutes favors only those whom the statute was
designed to protect. See SINGER, supra note 14, §60.01, at 147 ("A court cannot go
beyond reasonable bounds in applying the liberal construction in order to stay
within the prerogatives of the legislature."); Mister v. A.R.K Partnership, 553
N.E.2d 1152, 1159 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). As the discussion in Part II supra demon-
strates, no current state fair housing law can be properly construed to protect
unmarried cohabitants.
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case, the state cannot legitimately force landlords to rent to unmar-
ried couples unless unmarried couples in that jurisdiction face a hous-
ing shortage that cannot be eliminated without legislation.
Ultimately, state law defines the limits of the state's police power.
Nevertheless, there are generally accepted principles governing this
area of law. The state may enact legislation essential to the public
health, safety, and welfare.8 1 All state laws carry a presumption of
legitimacy, and the party challenging a statute bears the burden of
proving its invalidity.8 2 Although state law governs police power is-
sues, an illegitimate exercise of the police power deprives affected citi-
zens of due process and thus must be invalidated.8 3
The United States Supreme Court has defined the limits of the
state's police power as follows:
To justify the state in... interposing its authority in behalf of the public, it
must appear-First, that the interests of the public ... require such interfer-
ence; and, second, that the means are reasonably necessary for the accom-
plishment of the purpose, and not unduly oppressive upon individuals. The
legislature may not, under the guise of protecting the public interests, arbi-
trarily interfere with private business, or impose unusual and unnecessary
restrictions upon lawful occupations; in other words, its determination as to
what is a proper exercise of its police powers is not final or conclusive, but is
subject to the supervision of the courts. 8 4
This definition reveals several requisites for a legitimate exercise of
the police power, including the requirement of necessity, whereby the
law must be necessary to protect the public good.8 5 Earlier in this
century, only emergency circumstances satisfied this necessity test.8 6
A reasonableness standard has since replaced the emergency
requirement.8 7
Although the legislature's assessment of necessity is presumed
valid and thus is entitled to some deference, the legislature's mere as-
sertion that a law is necessary does not satisfy the necessity require-
81. See 16A AM. JuR. 2d Constitutional Law § 363 (1979).
82. See Goldblatt v. Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 596 (1962).
83. See Williamson County Reg'l Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, 473 U.S. 172,
197 (1985).
84. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133, 137 (1894), quoted with approval in Goldblatt v.
Town of Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 594-95 (1962).
85. See 16A Am. Jurm 2d Constitutional Law §§ 363, 370 (1979).
86. See, e.g., Chastleton Corp. v. Sinclair, 264 U.S. 543, 548-49 (1924)(noting that
while rent controls were necessary during a period of war emergency, the restric-
tions would no longer be valid once the emergency situation ceased); Edgar A.
Levy Leasing Co. v. Siegel, 258 U.S. 242, 245 (1922)(defining an emergency as a
condition "so grave that it constitute[s] a serious menace to the health, morality,
comfort, and even to the peace of a large part of the people of the state"); Block v.
Hirsch, 256 U.S. 135, 154-55 (1921)(noting that rent controls were necessary due
to the emergencies caused by war).
87. See, e.g., Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1018-23 (Cal. 1976); 16A
Azf. Ju a. 2d Constitutional Law § 387 (1979).
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ment.8 8 The Supreme Court has made this point clear in the related
area of takings:
In [Justice Blackmun's dissenting] view .... the test for required compensa-
tion [under the takings clause] is whether the legislature has recited a harm-
preventing justification for its action. Since such a justification can be formu-
lated in practically every case, this amounts to a test of whether the legisla-
ture has a stupid staff. We think the Takings Clause requires courts to do
more than insist upon artful harm-preventing characterizations. 8 9
Likewise, in the police power context, the state may not rely on naked
ipse dixits to justify its action.90 Rather, there must be evidence dem-
onstrating that the state action is necessary. A party challenging
state action can prevail by showing that there are no facts to justify
the state action.91 Although most laws survive challenges based upon
the state's police power, modern courts do invalidate unnecessary laws
that exceed the scope of the police power.9 2
The Supreme Court of California's decision in Birkenfeld v. City of
Berkeley93 provides an excellent illustration of how these police power
principles apply in the context of landlord and tenant law. In
88. See Bates v. City of Little Rock, 361 U.S. 516, 525 (1960); 16A Am. Jur. 2d Consti-
tutional Law §§ 387, 388 (1979).
89. Lucas v. South Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1025 n.12 (1992)(citation
omitted).
90. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 833 n.2 (1987)(re-
jecting "the peculiar proposition that a unilateral claim of entitlement by the gov-
ernment can alter property rights"); Village of Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co., 272
U.S. 365, 389 (1926)(a law which has "the character of a merely arbitrary fiat" is
not a legitimate exercise of the police power); 16A AM. JuR. 2d Constitutional Law
§ 387 (1979)("The mere assertion by the legislature that a statute relates to the
public health, safety, or welfare does not in itself bring that statute within the
police power of a state . . ").
91. See Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1019 (Cal. 1976).
92. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 839-40 (1987)(re-
jecting the state's justification for a permit condition and citing twenty-three
lower federal and state cases that reached a similar holding); Fay v. City of Chi-
cago, 390 N.E.2d 125 (Ill. App. Ct. 1979)(striking an ordinance as an invalid exer-
cise of police power); Little v. Winborn, 518 N.W.2d 384 (Iowa 1994)(striking
ordinance as an invalid exercise of police power); LaFourche Parish Council v.
Autin, 648 So. 2d 343 (La. 1994)(holding that a state statute which gave munici-
palities certain appointment powers was an invalid exercise of police power);
Whitehead Oil Co. v. City of Lincoln, 245 Neb. 660, 515 N.W.2d 390 (1994)(strik-
ing zoning ordinance as an invalid exercise of police power); Paterson Tavern &
Grill Owners Ass'n v. Borough of Hawthorne, 270 A.2d 628 (N.J. 1970)(invalidat-
ing an ordinance which restricted the ability of women to work in taverns); Fred
F. French Investing Co. v. City of New York, 350 N.E.2d 381 (N.Y. 1976)(striking
zoning ordinance as an invalid exercise of police power); Mahoney v. Township of
Hampton, 651 A.2d 525 (Pa. 1994)(striking zoning ordinance as an invalid exer-
cise of police power); L.A. Ray Realty v. Town Council, 698 A.2d 202 (R.I.
1997)(striking zoning ordinance as an invalid exercise of police power); County of
Spokane v. Valu-Mart, Inc., 419 P.2d 993 (Wash. 1966)(holding that an ordinance
affecting Sunday business was an invalid exercise of police power).
93. 550 P.2d 1001 (Cal. 1976).
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Birkenfeld, owners of rental property challenged a rent control ordi-
nance, arguing that the ordinance was illegitimate in the absence of
an emergency or a condition that constituted a "serious menace" to the
safety of a large portion of the citizens. 9 4 Surveying the law, the Cali-
fornia Supreme Court rejected the emergency doctrine, holding that
the appropriate test was whether the law or ordinance reasonably re-
lates to a legitimate governmental purpose.9 5 Nevertheless, the court
explicitly rejected the government's argument that it could establish
necessity by mere assertion:
[The constitutionality of residential rent controls under the police power de-
pends upon the actual existence of a housing shortage and its concomitant ill
effects of sufficient seriousness to make rent control a rational curative mea-
sure. Although the existence of constitutional facts upon which the validity of
an enactment depends is presumed in the absence of any showing to the con-
trary, their nonexistence can properly be established by proof.
9 6
The city offered extensive evidence of the shortage of affordable
housing for low-income, aged, and disabled residents. The property
owners countered by showing that housing conditions had improved
statewide in recent years, low-income housing was available in other
California cities, and the housing problems in Berkeley were no worse
than in other metropolitan areas. The court held that the necessity
requirement was met because the evidence of a housing shortage for
disadvantaged Berkeley residents was clear, and the city had the
power to safeguard and promote the welfare of people who chose to
live in its boundaries.9 7 Thus, the state may alter the landlord and
tenant relationship only when there are facts, not mere assertions, to
establish that the law is necessary.
B. Circumstances Required to Justify Forcing Landlords to
Rent to Unmarried Couples
There is currently no credible evidence that demonstrates unmar-
ried couples face such unfavorable conditions in the rental market
that the state may protect them. As Birkenfeld reflects, the state can-
not force landlords to rent to unmarried couples unless they face a
housing shortage that threatens the public welfare.98 No legislature
has explicitly protected such couples in the rental market, nor has any
legislature specifically found that unmarried couples face a shortage
of rental housing. The state actors that have sought to punish land-
lords for not renting to unmarried cohabitants have simply offered na-
94. See id. at 1018-19.
95. See id. at 1018-23.
96. Id. at 1024 (emphasis added)(citations omitted).
97. See id. at 1024-26.
98. See id. at 1024.
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ked assertions that it is necessary to do so. 99 Only the Alaska and
Michigan Supreme Courts have accepted this naked assertion offered
by the state or prospective tenants.lOO As we have seen, the landlord's
conduct is in fact not improperly discriminatory, 1o1 but even if it were,
the state's unsubstantiated claims alone cannot justify state action to
protect unmarried cohabitants.l0 2 A landlord defending against such
a claim can challenge the law successfully by showing that such
couples do not face housing shortages, and thus the state has no au-
thority to protect them.10 3
Commentators have offered several unconvincing arguments to try
to fill the void in the state's argument. Professor Maureen Markey
offers the standard justification for forcing religious landlords to rent
to unmarried cohabitants.0 4 She notes the dramatic increase in un-
married cohabitation since 1960: an increase of 800 percent from 1960
to 1970, and another six-fold increase from 1970 to 1992.105 Based on
these statistics, she asserts that "l[b] oth judicial recognition of the soci-
etal trend and judicial concern for protecting the legislatively man-
dated rights of such a large and growing segment of the population are
important."1 0 6
Assuming for the sake of argument that Professor Markey is cor-
rect that such "rights" have been legislatively mandated and are im-
portant, she commits two logical fallacies in this argument. The first
is argumentum ad populum, or appeal to popular opinion. The mere
fact that certain behavior is widely accepted or engaged in does not
justify that behavior or the state's sanctioning of it. For example, the
fact that an overwhelming majority of Southerners supported slavery
over a century ago did not justify laws institutionalizing slavery.
Moreover, her conclusion is a non sequitur. The mere fact that
there are increasing numbers of unmarried cohabitants does not mean
that they, as a class, face discrimination that undermines their ability
to obtain housing. For example, civil rights laws protecting minorities
were necessary not because of the number of minorities, but because
of the deplorable and well-documented history of racial discrimination
99. See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282-83
(Alaska 1994); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 929
n.21 (Cal. 1996)(plurality opinion); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233,
238 (Mass. 1994); McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Mich. 1998); State
v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9-11 (Minn. 1990).
100. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282-83 (Alaska
1994); McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Mich. 1998).
101. See supra notes 50-57 and accompanying text.
102. See supra notes 88-97 and accompanying text.
103. See Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1024 (Cal. 1976).
104. See Markey, The Price, supra note 6, at 740.
105. See id.
106. Id. at 743.
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in this country and the resulting threat that discrimination posed to
our public welfare.
Professor Markey's statistical evidence actually undermines her
conclusion. Assume, for the sake of argument, that she is correct "that
the majority of the population do not find unmarried cohabitation im-
moral,"'0 7 and that "[tihe growing public acceptance of unmarried co-
habitation is pervasive."1 0 Assume further that she is correct that
"despite some adverse court decisions regarding their rights, the num-
bers of unmarried couples are growing and will continue to grow."1 0 9
If these points are true, they actually show that unmarried couples
require no state protection. Presumably, landlords' views mirror
those of the populace at large. If most landlords approve of unmarried
cohabitation, then unmarried couples will have no trouble finding ade-
quate housing. If increasing percentages of Americans will continue
to support unmarried cohabitation, the number of landlords who will
rent to such couples will continue to increase proportionately. Thus,
the evidence suggests there is no "actual ... housing shortage ... of
sufficient seriousness"1 1 0 to justify state action. Based on this statisti-
cal evidence, the state is no more justified in protecting unmarried
couples in the housing market now than it would have been in enact-
ing civil rights laws to protect non-minorities in the 1960's.
One student commentator leaped from Professor Markey's conclu-
sions to the patently inconsistent proposition that discrimination
against unmarried couples is widespread.1 1 1 To support this conclu-
sion, this student offered only two facts: first, in a four-year period in
the late 1980s, there were sixty-two complaints of marital status dis-
crimination in the city of Los Angeles, or an average of 15.5 com-
plaints per year; second, in 1989, there were approximately eighty-five
complaints of marital status discrimination in all of California.1 12
These numbers are misleading because they reflect all claims of mari-
tal status discrimination, including, for example, alleged discrimina-
tion against married couples, and not just claims by unmarried
cohabitants. Therefore, they potentially overstate the extent of al-
leged discrimination against unmarried couples. Moreover, these
figures only demonstrate the number of complaints filed and do not
reflect whether the complaints were legitimate. Nevertheless, despite
their shortcomings, these figures actually prove that religious land-
lords pose no tangible threat to the ability of unmarried couples to find
suitable housing. In 1990, Los Angeles had a population of
107. Id. at 741.
108. Id.
109. Id. at 743.
110. Birkenfeld v. City of Berkeley, 550 P.2d 1001, 1024 (Cal. 1976).
111. See Anderson, supra note 6, at 1018 n.10.
112. See id.
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3,486,000.113 Given that the city averaged only 15.5 complaints of
marital status discrimination per year at approximately the same
time, the ratio of complaints to the population was 1:224,903. The
number of complaints statewide in California at the same time was
proportionately even smaller. California had a population of
29,218,000 in 1989.114 The ratio of marital status discrimination com-
plaints to the population statewide was thus only 1:343,741.
Although it is impossible to determine precisely how often land-
lords exclude unmarried couples, some other statistics are enlighten-
ing. State legislatures began enacting fair housing laws in the late
1960s and early 1970s. In the three decades since then, there have
been only seventeen published decisions across the country involving
allegations of marital status discrimination against unmarried
couples in housing transactions.11 5 Of those cases, only twelve in-
volved alleged discrimination by private landlords,ll6 and of those
twelve landlords, religious objections motivated only eight of them.1 ' 7
113. See BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE UNITED STATES 46
(1997).
114. See id. at 28.
115. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, Nos. 97-35220 & 97-35221, 1999
WL 11337 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n,
874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994); Foreman v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 779
P.2d 1199 (Alaska 1989); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d
909 (Cal. 1996)(plurality opinion); Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal.
1992), review dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993)(not published in official re-
porter and cannot be cited in California); Hess v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 187 Cal. Rptr. 712 (Ct. App. 1982); Atkisson v. Kern County Hous.
Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375 (Ct. App. 1976); Jasniowski v. Rushing, 678 N.E.2d 743
(Ill. App. Ct. 1997), vacated, 685 N.E.2d 622 (Ill. 1997); Mister v. A.R.I. Partner-
ship, 553 N.E.2d 1152 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); Maryland Comm'n on Human Rela-
tions v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 475 A.2d 1192 (Md. 1984); Prince George's County
v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 431 A.2d 745 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981); Attorney Gen.
v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994); Worcester Hous. Auth. v. Massachu-
setts Comm'n Against Discrimination, 547 N.E.2d 43 (Mass. 1989); McCready v.
Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723 (Mich. 1998); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2 (Minn.
1990); Hudson View Properties v. Weiss, 450 N.E.2d 234 (N.Y. 1983); McFadden
v. Elma Country Club, 613 P.2d 146 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980).
116. The following cases did not involve private landlord and tenant disputes: Atkis-
son v. Kern County Hous. Auth., 130 Cal. Rptr. 375, 377 (Ct. App. 1976)(public
housing); Maryland Comm'n on Human Relations v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 475
A.2d 1192, 1193 (Md. 1984)(cooperative housing development); Prince George's
County v. Greenbelt Homes, Inc., 431 A.2d 745, 746 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1981)(co-
operative housing development); Worcester Hous. Auth. V. Massachusetts
Comm'n Against Discrimination, 547 N.E.2d 43, 45 (Mass. 1989)(public housing);
McFadden v. Elma Country Club, 613 P.2d 146, 148 (Wash. Ct. App. 1980)(mem-
bership in a country club that included the privilege of property ownership in the
community).
117. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, Nos. 97-35220 & 97-35221, 1999
WL 11337, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 276-77 (Alaska 1994); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous.
520 [Vol. 77:494
RELIGIOUS LANDLORDS
Perhaps most significantly, courts have issued published decisions
resolving these disputes in only nine of the twenty-one jurisdictions in
which marital status discrimination is generally prohibited.118 Thus,
there are no reported decisions involving such disputes in twelve of
the twenty-one jurisdictions that have statutes generally proscribing
marital status discrimination. 1 19
Given that landlords have no economic incentive to exclude unmar-
ried couples, it is not surprising that very few landlords do so. If un-
married couples are as numerous as the statistics suggest,12 0 then
landlords who refuse to rent to them will significantly limit their pool
of prospective tenants. This substantial market reduction will tend to
deflate the reasonable rent the landlord will be able to command on
the market.121 Moreover, if the state prosecutes the landlord for com-
mitting marital status discrimination, the landlord will face signifi-
cant civil and criminal penalties, attorney's fees, court costs, and
possibly even prison time.12 2 Given these daunting disincentives, it is
not surprising that so few landlords, even those who are devoutly reli-
gious, refuse to rent to unmarried couples.
The final justification offered for protecting unmarried cohabitants
is that prospective tenants should be able to live where they choose. 123
Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 912 (Cal. 1996) (plurality opinion); Donahue v. Fair Em-
ployment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32,33 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted,
825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993) (not pub-
lished in official reporter and cannot be cited in California); Jasniowski v. Rush-
ing, 678 N.E.2d 743, 745 (M. App. Ct. 1997), vacated, 685 N.E.2d 622 (M11. 1997);
Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 234 (Mass. 1994); McCready v. Hof-
flus, 586 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Mich. 1998); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 3-4 (Minn.
1990). In Mister, the landlords claimed on appeal that their refusal to rent to an
unmarried couple was motivated by religious beliefs, but the Appellate Court of
Illinois refused to consider this issue because there was no evidence in the record
to support it. See Mister v. A.R.K. Partnership, 553 N.E.2d 1152, 1154 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1990).
118. Compare supra note 115 with supra notes 24 & 46.
119. Those jurisdictions are Colorado, Delaware, the District of Columbia, Hawaii,
Montana, Nebraska, New Hampshire, New Jersey, North Dakota, Rhode Island,
Vermont, and Washington. See supra note 118 and accompanying text.
120. See supra note 105 and accompanying text.
121. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 954 (Cal.
1996)(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636
N.E.2d 233, 240 (Mass. 1994). Cf Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n,
Nos. 97-35220 & 97-35221, 1999 WL 11337 at *17 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999)(noting
that a landlord who objects to renting to unmarried cohabitants "has a distinct
economic disincentive to speak up" about his views).
122. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 954 (Cal.
1996)(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636
N.E.2d 233, 240 (Mass. 1994).
123. See Markey, The Price, supra note 6, at 795 (noting that allowing landlords to
exclude unmarried couples "results in direct and immediate harm7 to those
couples); Anderson, supra note 6, at 1018 n.10 (using anecdotal evidence of two
landlords who would not rent to a few unmarried couples to justify laws protect-
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Commentators never identify the source of this alleged right. The
common law, which gave the landlord complete discretion in selecting
tenants,12 4 certainly did not provide it. As the United States Supreme
Court has explained, the Constitution likewise does not give citizens
the right to live wherever they choose:
We do not denigrate the importance of decent, safe, and sanitary housing.
But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies for every social and
economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any constitutional
guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality, or any recognition of
the right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the
term of his lease .... 125
Any such right can, therefore, only exist as a matter of legislative
grace. "Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate
housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relationships are legisla-
tive, not judicial, functions."12 6 However, the legislature cannot act
beyond the scope of its police power. Thus, the argument that pro-
spective tenants have a right to the housing of their choice is entirely
circular. The fundamental question is whether the state may properly
legislate such a right. As we have seen, there is currently no police
power justification for giving unmarried couples the right to live wher-
ever they choose.
If the state can create a housing right for unmarried couples who
face no housing shortage, there are no practical limits to state author-
ity. For example, what would stop the state from proscribing "pecuni-
ary status discrimination" in housing transactions, i.e., discrimination
based on the tenant's ability to pay the rent? Absent a complete trans-
formation to a totalitarian government, the state has no authority to
enact such legislation that would unnecessarily infringe upon the
property rights of landlords.
There is no credible evidence that religious landlords pose any tan-
gible threat to unmarried cohabitants. This lack of evidence explains
why no legislature has yet expressly protected unmarried cohabitants
in housing transactions. If unmarried cohabitants truly face housing
shortages because landlords will not rent to them, then the legislature
can remedy that shortage through exercise of its police power so long
as that exercise does not conflict with existing laws and policies. 127 In
ing such couples); Eckel, supra note 6, at 813 (referring to "the interests of pro-
spective tenants who enter the marketplace and expect to choose freely where to
live").
124. See CRIBBET & JOHNSON, supra note 16, at 241.
125. Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972).
126. Id.
127. See supra notes 66-80 and accompanying text (discussing the public policy rea-
sons why states should not protect unmarried cohabitants in housing
transactions).
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the absence of evidence of such a shortage, the state may not force
landlords to rent to couples who choose to cohabit without marrying.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL AVENUES TO STRICT
SCRUTINY REVIEW
Even if circumstances justify the state forcing landlords to rent to
unmarried cohabitants, a landlord may have valid constitutional ob-
jections to the law. In each case where the landlord has raised a con-
stitutional challenge to a claim of marital status discrimination, the
landlord has sought to protect his right to the free exercise of reli-
gion.128 Accordingly, the analytical starting point is the Free Exercise
Clause of the First Amendment.
A. Federal Free Exercise/Establishment Clause Claims
1. Overview of the Free Exercise Clause
The First Amendment provides that "Congress shall make no law
respecting an establishment of religion or prohibiting the free exercise
thereof."'129 These few words have generated significant controversy.
The Supreme Court's free exercise jurisprudence has been unpredict-
able and inconsistent. Not surprisingly, it has come under regular
scholarly attack. One commentator has observed that the "Court's re-
cent decisions on the rights of religious minorities in America ...
[have] evoked withering attacks in the popular and professional me-
dia. The Court's entire record on religious liberty has become vilified
for its lack of consistent and coherent principles and its uncritical use
of mechanical tests and empty metaphors."'130 Other commentators
have noted that
Religion Clause jurisprudence... has been described on all sides, and even by
Justices themselves, as unprincipled, incoherent, and unworkable .... Mhe
Court must now grapple seriously with the formidable interpretive problems
that were overlooked or given short shrift in the past. The task is an urgent
128. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 276-77 (Alaska
1994); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 912 (Cal.
1996)(plurality opinion); Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 32, 33 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review
dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993)(not published in official reporter and cannot
be cited in California); Jasniowski v. Rushing, 678 N.E.2d 743, 745 (Ill. App. Ct.),
vacated, 685 N.E.2d 622 (Il1. 1997); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233,
234 (Mass. 1994); McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 725 (Mich. 1998); State
v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 3-4 (Minn. 1990).
129. U.S. CoNsT. amend. I.
130. John Witte, Jr., The Essential Rights and Liberties of Religion in the American
Constitutional Experiment, 71 NoTRE DA1m L. Ruv. 371, 374 (1996).
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one, for it concerns nothing less than the cultural foundations of our experi-
ment in ordered liberty. 1 3 1
Whatever one thinks of the Court's interpretation of the Free Exer-
cise Clause, the principles that currently govern this area of law are
relatively straightforward. To understand these principles, it is neces-
sary to review the development of the Court's free exercise
jurisprudence.
The Framers envisioned that the First Amendment would govern a
predominantly Christian nation. As Professor Michael McConnell
commented:
It is a mistake to read the religion clauses under the now prevalent assump-
tion that the governing intellectual climate of the late eighteenth century was
that of deism .... America was in the wake of a great religious revival....
[Tihe Enlightenment world view excludes many, probably most, people who
lived in America in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries. To determine
the meaning of the religion clauses, it is necessary to see them through the
eyes of their proponents, most of whom were members of the most fervent and
evangelical denominations in the nation.1 3 2
This Christian worldview was exemplified by Patrick Henry, who said
that "[lit cannot be emphasized too strongly or too often that this great
nation was founded, not by religionists, but by Christians; not on reh-
gions, but on the gospel of Jesus Christ."133
Although predominantly Christian, the Framers practiced their
faith in diverse expressions. The Framers ultimately agreed to guar-
antee freedom of religion for all while assuring that no national
church, like the one in England, would ever be imposed on the people.
Their compromise solution was embodied in the First Amendment,
which has remained unchanged since first adopted.13 4 As one com-
mentator explained:
The Free Exercise Clause was designed to work a dramatic change in the
relationship between the church and the state. By it, the church would be
freed from the power of the state. The Establishment Clause, in turn, would
prevent the state from enforcing the rules of the church or from usurping her
role in civil society. 1 3 5
Despite the unchanged and relatively simple wording of the Free
Exercise Clause, its meaning has been the subject of significant de-
bate, particularly as our society has become increasingly pluralistic.
Some scholars, as exemplified by Professor McConnell, have argued
131. Mary Ann Glendon & Raul F. Yanes, Structural Free Exercise, 90 MICH. L. REV.
477, 478 (1991).
132. Michael W. McConnell, The Origins and Historical Understanding of Free Exer-
cise of Religion, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1409, 1437 (1990)(citations omitted).
133. DAVID BARTON, AMERICA's GODLY HERITAGE 5 (Wall Builders 1993)(quoting STEVE
C. DAwsON, GOD'S PROVIDENCE IN AaMERICA'S HIsTORY 1:5 (1988)).
134. See McConnell, supra note 132, at 1473-85 (describing the development of the
Free Exercise Clause).
135. Herbert W. Titus, The Free Exercise Clause: Past, Present and Future, 6 REGENT
U. L. REV. 7, 62 (1995).
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that the Free Exercise Clause was designed to protect religiously mo-
tivated conduct as well as freedom of belief.136 The text of the amend-
ment, however, does not explicitly protect rights of conscience.
13 7
Professor McConnell, nevertheless, bases his thesis in part on the fact
that the terms "free exercise of religion" and "liberty of conscience"
were used interchangeably by James Madison when explaining the
meaning of the First Amendment.' 3 8 Given his view that the Framers
intended to protect rights of conscience, Professor McConnell argues
that the Free Exercise Clause allows religious citizens exemptions
from laws that would force them to violate their conscience.
1 39
Other commentators have argued that the Framers did not intend
the Free Exercise Clause to allow religious exemptions from neutral,
generally applicable laws that inconvenience religiously motivated
conduct.i 40 For example, Herbert Titus advocates a jurisdictional ap-
proach to the First Amendment Religion Clauses that would allow for
a robust church, freed from the tyranny of an over-reaching state.' 4 '
Under his reading of the First Amendment's Religion Clauses, the
Framers envisioned the church and the state operating within well-
defined and mutually exclusive jurisdictions.' 4 2 On the one hand, the
state cannot regulate matters of religion, or "those matters that be-
long[ ] exclusively to God outside the jurisdiction of the State."i 43 On
the other hand, the state is free to require citizens to comply with all
laws the state has the authority to enact, even if a particular citizen
objects to a law on religious grounds.' 44 The Supreme Court recently
returned to an approach similar to Titus', after a relatively brief foray
into Professor McConnell's approach.
The seminal free exercise decision was Reynolds v. United
States,'45 in which the Court refused to exempt a Mormon from a law
that proscribed polygamy.' 4 6 Engaging in an historical analysis, the
136. See McConnell, supra note 132, at 1490.
137. See id.
138. See id. at 1494 (citing James Madison, Report on the Virginia Resolutions (Jan.
18, 1800), reprinted in 5 THE FOUNDERS' CONSTUION 141 (Philip B. Kurland &
Ralph Lerner eds., 1987)).
139. See id. at 1511-17.
140. See, e.g., William P. Marshall, In Defense of Smith and Free Exercise Revisionism,
58 U. Cm L. Rav. 308, 326 (1991); Titus, supra note 135, at 10-13, 52-63. Cf.
Philip A.- Hamburger, A Constitutional Right of Religious Exemption: An Histori-
cal Perspective, 60 GEO. WASH. L. REv. 915 (1992)(arguing that eighteenth-cen-
tury Americans did not understand the Free Exercise Clause to provide
individual exemptions).
141. See Titus, supra note 135, at 56-61.
142. See id. at 62.
143. Id. at 12.
144. See id. at 12-15, 52-63.
145. 98 U.S. 145 (1878).
146. See id. at 166-67.
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Court determined that "religion" refers to the duty each individual
owes to the Creator, and that the state has no authority to intrude on
religious opinion or profession.' 4 7 However, the state can regulate
"overt acts against peace and good order."14s Although the state could
not require Mormons to believe in monogamy, it could determine that
monogamy would "be the law of social life under its dominion.'4 9
Given that laws proscribing odious marital and sexual conduct were
part of the common law tradition, the law criminalizing polygamy was
a legitimate exercise of the police power.So The only remaining ques-
tion was whether Reynolds was entitled to an exemption from the law
based on a sincere religious objection.151 The Court held that he was
not:
Laws are made for the government of actions, and while they cannot interfere
with mere religious belief and opinions, they may with practices.
... Can a man excuse his practices to the contrary because of his religious
belief? To permit this would be to make the professed doctrines of religious
belief superior to the law of the land, and in effect to permit every citizen to
become a law unto himself.
... It matters not that his belief was a part of his professed religion: it was
still belief, and belief only.
... [I]t would be dangerous to hold that the offender might escape punish-
ment because he religiously believed the law which he had broken ought never
to have been made. 1 5 2
The Court essentially followed the Reynolds jurisdictional approach
for eighty-five years and thus did not generally exempt religious objec-
tors from valid laws.15 3
In 1963, the Court began a twenty-seven year experiment in grant-
ing exemptions to religious objectors. In Sherbert v. Verner,15 4 a Sev-
enth-Day Adventist refused to work on Saturday, which she
considered the Sabbath.155 The state refused to pay unemployment
benefits to her because its unemployment laws only awarded benefits
to persons who were involuntarily unemployed.15 6 The state argued
that its work requirement was necessary to protect against fraudulent
claims.'57 Under the Reynolds jurisdictional approach, the Court
should have ruled in favor of the state.158 Instead, the Court estab-
147. See id. at 161-67.
148. Id. at 163.
149. Id. at 166.
150. See id.
151. See id.
152. Id. at 166-67.
153. See generally Titus, supra note 135, at 13-15 (summarizing the Court's free exer-
cise jurisprudence through 1960).
154. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
155. See id. at 399.
156. See id. at 401.
157. See id. at 407.
158. See id. at 418-23 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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lished a strict scrutiny test for cases involving legitimate regulations
that inhibit religiously motivated conduct.' 59 The Court held that the
state did not meet its burden of satisfying the strict scrutiny test and
thus had to grant Sherbert a religious exemption from its unemploy-
ment laws.16 0
In Wisconsin v. Yoder,16 1 the Court made it clear that it had wholly
abandoned the Reynolds jurisdictional approach in favor of a strict
scrutiny test for all free exercise claims. 162 The Court granted an ex-
emption to Amish parents from the state's compulsory school attend-
ance law because the state was unable to show that the exemption
would undermine the state's interest in compulsory education.163
This opinion seemingly held great promise for future religious objec-
tors, but beginning with United States v. Lee,' 6 4 the Court dashed any
hopes of wide-ranging exemptions. In Lee, a unanimous Court refused
to exempt an Amish man from the obligation to pay social security
taxes, holding that "[tlo maintain an organized society that guaran-
tees religious freedom to a great variety of faiths requires that some
religious practices yield to the common good."165 Essentially, the
Court held in Lee that the state met the strict scrutiny standard in
defending the social security system from attack.16 6 In the years fol-
lowing Lee, the Court consistently refused to grant religious exemp-
tions to objectors,' 6 7 with the exception of cases involving
unemployment benefits, in which the Court simply followed
Sherbert.'68
In 1990, the Court abruptly and unexpectedly returned to the
Reynolds jurisdictional approach. In Employment Division v.
Smith,169 two drug rehabilitation workers were fired from their jobs
for using peyote during a Native American church ceremony. They
filed for unemployment benefits, which the State of Oregon denied be-
cause the workers had been discharged for work-related miscon-
duct.170 The workers, relying on the Sherbert line of cases, claimed
159. See id. at 402-03.
160. See id. at 410.
161. 406 U.S. 205 (1972).
162. See id. at 215 ("The essence of all that has been said and written on the subject is
that only those interests of the highest order and those not otherwise served can
overbalance legitimate claims to the free exercise of religion.").
163. See id. at 215-36.
164. 455 U.S. 252 (1982).
165. Id. at 259.
166. See id. at 258-61.
167. See Titus, supra note 135, at 19-22.
168. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832-35 (1989); Hob-
bie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 139-46 (1987); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713-20 (1981).
169. 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
170. See id. at 874.
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that the denial was a violation of their free exercise rights. 171 The
Court noted that Sherbert and the other employment benefit cases
were not controlling because those cases did not involve denial of ben-
efits due to illegal conduct. 17 2 Nevertheless, the Court did not rest its
decision solely on that factual distinction. Rather, the Court com-
pletely reworked its free exercise jurisprudence by returning to a ju-
risdictional approach that generally does not allow exemptions for
religious objectors.173
The Court specifically held that the Free Exercise Clause "does not
relieve an individual of the obligation to comply with 'a valid and neu-
tral law of general applicability on the ground that the law proscribes
(or prescribes) conduct that his religion prescribes (or proscribes).'"1 74
The Court thereby retreated to the humble beginnings of Reynolds.
The state cannot interfere with the freedom to believe and profess
whatever religious doctrine one desires, nor can it directly regulate
physical acts of worship or proselytizing.' 75 The state may, on the
other hand, exercise its police power in a neutral, generally applicable
way that incidentally restricts religiously motivated conduct. How-
ever, if the state adopts a regulation that is not neutral and generally
applicable, the law will be subject to strict scrutiny review. 1 76
Employment Division v. Smith was clearly contrary to the Sherbert
approach whereby the Court applied strict scrutiny review regardless
of whether the law was neutral or generally applicable. However, the
Court explained in Employment Division v. Smith that it applied strict
scrutiny review in the Sherbert line of cases, and in some other earlier
171. See id. at 876.
172. See id. at 885 ("We conclude today that the sounder approach ... is to hold the
[Sherbert] test inapplicable to such challenges.").
173. See generally Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990).
174. Id. at 879 (quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 263 n.3 (1982)(Stevens, J.,
concurring)). This portion of Smith is patently inconsistent with the following
excerpt from Yoder:
Nor can this case be disposed of on the grounds that [the state law] ap-
plies uniformly to all citizens of the State and does not, on its face, dis-
criminate against religions or a particular religion, or that it is
motivated by legitimate secular concerns. A regulation neutral on its
face may, in its application, nonetheless offend the constitutional re-
quirement for governmental neutrality if it unduly burdens the free ex-
ercise of religion.
Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 220 (1972) (citations omitted). Nonetheless,
rather than taking the intellectually consistent approach of disavowing Sherbert
and its progeny, including Yoder, the Court simply chose to limit those cases to
their specific facts. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-84 (1990).
175. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877 (1990).
176. See, e.g., Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520,
531-47 (1993). Laws are not neutral or generally applicable if they are not
facially neutral, are facially neutral but were enacted to target a particular reli-
gion, or are biased against some, or all, religious beliefs. See id. at 532-33; see
also infra notes 188-91 and accompanying text.
[Vol. 77:494
RELIGIOUS LANDLORDS
decisions, because those cases involved "hybrid" claims, where some
other claim based on a constitutional protection or fundamental right
was raised in addition to a free exercise claim.1 77
In direct response to Employment Division v. Smith, Congress en-
acted the Religious Freedom Restoration Act (RFRA).178 In RFRA,
Congress specifically criticized Employment Division v. Smith, 179 and
attempted to reinstate the strict scrutiny standard of Sherbert and its
progeny. 8 0 Despite the wide-ranging coalition that backed RFRA, in-
cluding a virtually unanimous Congress, the Court recently struck
RFRA down as exceeding Congress' enforcement powers under section
five of the Fourteenth Amendment.18 '
Under the controlling Employment Division v. Smith standard, a
law that proscribes discrimination against unmarried couples in hous-
ing transactions, without providing more, would be neutral and gener-
ally applicable.18 2 If the legislature did not enact the law to target
religious belief, a religious landlord could not obtain an exemption
from that law under the federal Free Exercise Clause.' 8 3 However,
some state laws are not neutral or generally applicable. Also, a state
constitution may more vigorously protect free exercise rights than
does the First Amendment.' 8 4 Thus, the landlord may be able to ob-
tain strict scrutiny review of the statute under these theories.
2. Limited Exemptions Which Do Not Protect Religious
Objectors
In the several jurisdictions in which a statute prohibits landlords
from discriminating on the basis of marital status, the legislature has
provided limited exemptions from the fair housing law generally or
specifically from the provision that proscribes marital status discrimi-
nation in housing. Although these exemptions vary somewhat, they
typically give preferential treatment to certain religious organiza-
177. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
178. 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000bb to 2000bb-4 (1994).
179. See id. § 2000bb(a).
180. See id. § 2000bb(b).
181. See City ofBoerne v. Flores, 521 U.S. 507 (1997)(holding that the Freedom Resto-
ration Act exceeded Congress' §5 enforcement powers).
182. As will be discussed below, however, the court must strictly scrutinize a statute
that additionally provides limited exemptions that do not include all religious
objectors. See infra notes 185-224 and accompanying text.
183. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of -Iialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-
47 (1993)(holding that a law that was generally applicable on its face but was
enacted to target the practices of one religion was unconstitutional).
184. See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982)("[A] state
court is entirely free to read its own state's constitution more broadly than this
Court reads the Federal Constitution, or to reject the mode of analysis used by
this Court in favor of a different analysis of its [own] corresponding constitutional
guarantee.").
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tions,185 and to landlords who live on the premises and/or do not rent
multiple units.1 8 6 These laws do not exempt other landlords who have
equally genuine religious convictions against renting to unmarried
couples. Even if a court is determined to protect unmarried couples by
extending the marital status provision of the fair housing law beyond
its plain meaning,'-8 7 the court must strictly scrutinize the law be-
cause these limited exemptions violate both the neutrality/general ap-
plicability standard in Employment Division v. Smith and the
Establishment Clause.
a. Free Exercise Clause-Neutrality/General Applicability
A statute that provides limited exemptions, particularly when it
exempts some religious individuals or entities and not others, is not
185. See CAL. Gov'T CODE §12955.4 (West Supp. 1998)(religious organizations ex-
empted); COLO. REV. STAT. §24-34-502(3) (West Supp. 1998) (religious organiza-
tions exempted); DEL. CODE ANN. tit. 6 §4607(a) (1993)(exemption for religious
organizations); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B, §21(d)(2)(e) (1994)(religious organiza-
tions exempted); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §354-A:13(c)H (1995)(religious organiza-
tions exempted); N.Y. ExEc. LAW §296(11) (McKinney 1998)(religious
organizations exempted); R.I. GEN. LAws §34-37-4.2 (Supp. 1997)(religious orga-
nizations exempted).
186. See HAW. REV. STAT. §515-4(a)(1)(2) (1993)(exemption for landlord who lives on
the premises and rents one other unit and landlords who rent four rooms or less
and reside on the premises); MD. ANN. CODE art. 49B §21(a)(2) (1994)(owner is
exempt if rooms are rented in the owner's principal residence and the owner
rents no more that five units); MIcH. Comp. LAws ANN. §37.2503(1)(a) (West
1996)(landlord is exempt for renting one additional unit in principal place of resi-
dence); MINN. STAT. ANN. §363.02 subd. 2(b) (West 1991)(exemption for rental by
resident owner or occupier of a one-family accommodation); MONT. CODE ANN.
§49-2-305(f)(2) (1997)(exemption for rental of sleeping rooms in private resi-
dence); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. §354-A-13I(b)(c) (1995) (exemption for landlord who
resides on the premises and rents accommodations for no more than three fami-
lies or rents no more than five rooms); N.Y. ExEc. LAw §296(5)(a)(3) (McKinney
Supp. 1998)(exemption for the rental of housing of two or less units where the
landlord resides and for the rental of rooms in the landlord's residence); WASH.
REV. CODE ANN. §49.60.222(2)(c) (West Supp. 1998)(exemption for landlord who
rents three single houses or less and for landlords who rent four units or less
within landlord's residence).
187. As was explained in section II supra, no current state fair housing law can prop-
erly be construed to force landlords to rent to unmarried cohabitants. Neverthe-
less, courts in four states have construed provisions proscribing marital status
discrimination to forbid landlords from excluding unmarried couples. See Swan-
ner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282-83 (Alaska 1994);
Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 925 (Cal. 1996)(plu-
rality opinion); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Mass. 1994); Mc-
Cready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 726, 728 (Mich. 1998). The discussion in this
subsection is accordingly limited to jurisdictions which have statutes proscribing
marital status discrimination. If, in the future, a state legislature adopts a stat-
ute that explicitly protects unmarried cohabitants but only provides limited ex-
emptions, that law should be subjected to strict scrutiny review as well.
[Vol. 77:494
RELIGIOUS LANDLORDS
neutral or generally applicable.SS "At a minimum, the protections of
the Free Exercise Clause pertain if the law at issue discriminates
against some or all religious beliefs .. ."189 A law that exempts some
organized religious institutions, but not other religious institutions or
individuals, discriminates on the basis of religion. For the legislature
to maintain religious neutrality, it must either provide no religious
exemptions or open-ended religious exemptions. Otherwise, the state
impermissibly favors some religious beliefs over others.190 Fair hous-
ing laws that exempt some, but not all, religiously motivated land-
lords are neither neutral nor generally applicable and accordingly
must be subjected to strict scrutiny review.191
b. Establishment Clause
Similarly, a statute that grants a preference to one class of reli-
gious beliefs or groups, but denies that preference to others, is also
subject to strict scrutiny under the Establishment Clause. In Larson
v. Valente,192 the Supreme Court considered an Establishment Clause
challenge to a statute governing reporting requirements for charitable
organizations.1 93 This statute initially included an exemption for all
churches, but the legislature later amended it to exempt only those
churches receiving more than fifty percent of their contributions from
members or affiliated organizations. 19 4 The legislative history demon-
strated explicit legislative intent to include particular religious de-
nominations and to exclude others. 195 The Court held that where a
state law distinguishes between religious beliefs, the state must show
that the law serves a compelling state interest and is narrowly drawn
to achieve that end.' 96 In religious exemption cases, there must be a
close fit between the preference and the interest. 9 7
188. Neutrality and general applicability are not wholly distinct standards. "Neutral-
ity and general applicability are interrelated, and... failure to satisfy one re-
quirement is a likely indication that the other has not been satisfied." Church of
the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531 (1993).
189. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531
(1993); see also Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 884 (1990)("[W]here the
state has in place a system of individual exemptions, it may not refuse to extend
that system to cases of 'religious hardship' without compelling reason.").
190. See Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 531-
32 (1993).
191. See id. at 533, 546.
192. 456 U.S. 228 (1982).
193. See id. at 230.
194. See id. at 230-32.
195. See id. at 254.
196. See id. at 246 ("[W]hen we are presented with a state law granting denomina-
tional preference, our precedents demand that we treat the law as suspect and
that we apply strict scrutiny in adjudging its constitutionality.").
197. See id. at 246-47. Cf Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)("The unconsti-
tutionality of the disqualification of the Sabbatarian is thus compounded by the
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Although Larson involved explicit legislative intent to discriminate
among religious beliefs, the Supreme Court subsequently ordered that
the Larson strict scrutiny analysis must also be applied when legisla-
tive intent is benign.198 In Grant v. Washington Public Employment
Relations Commission,199 the Court vacated a Washington Supreme
Court decision that upheld the constitutionality of a statutory exemp-
tion scheme similar to those in several state fair housing laws.20 0 The
Washington statute permitted individuals belonging to an estab-
lished religious institution to opt out of paying union dues but denied
the exemption to other persons who had religious objections to union
membership but did not belong to an established religious group. 20
The Supreme Court ordered the Washington Supreme Court to recon-
sider its decision in light of Larson.202
Two federal courts have applied Larson and Grant in contexts sim-
ilar to the one at issue in this Article. In Wilson v. NLRB,203 the court
held that the religious objector exemption of the National Labor Rela-
tions Act (NLRA) violated the federal Establishment Clause because it
preferred some forms of religious belief over others.20 4 The court
stated that section 19 of the NLRA facially discriminated among reli-
gions because it exempted from union membership only those employ-
ees who were members of "bona fide" religious organizations with
tenets opposed to union membership.205 Individuals who did not be-
long to such organizations were not exempt even though their reli-
gious convictions against union membership were also sincere. 20 6 The
court ruled that section 19 created an impermissible "preference by
conferring a benefit on members of the religious organizations de-
scribed in the statute."20 7 The court dismissed the NLRB's contention
that section 19 served a compelling state interest.208 The Board had
religious discrimination which South Carolina's general statutory scheme neces-
sarily effects.").
198. See Grant v. Washington Pub. Employment Relations Comm'n, 456 U.S. 955
(1982).
199. 456 U.S. 955 (1982).
200. See id., vacating and remanding Grant v. Washington Pub. Employment Rela-
tions Comm'n, 635 P.2d 1071 (Wash. 1981).
201. See Grant v. Spellman, 664 P.2d 1227, 1229 (Wash. 1983).
202. See Grant v. Washington Pub. Employment Relations Comm'n, 456 U.S. 955(1982). On remand, the Washington Supreme Court found a way to interpret the
statutory language so as to include religiously motivated objectors who did not
belong to an established religious group. See Grant v. Spellman, 664 P.2d 1227,
1230 (Wash. 1983).
203. 920 F.2d 1282 (6th Cir. 1990).
204. See id. at 1290. The National Labor Relations Act is found at 29 U.S.C. § 169
(1994).
205. See Wilson v. NLRB, 920 F.2d 1282, 1287 (6th Cir. 1990).
206. See id.
207. Id.
208. See id.
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asserted that Congress drew the exemption as it did so that the "'diffi-
cult and troublesome'... inquiries concerning the religious nature of
an objector's beliefs" could be directed to the federal courts where they
could be properly resolved.2 0 9 The Sixth Circuit ruled that the
Board's explanation was insufficient to meet its burden under strict
scrutiny analysis.210
Similarly, in Children's Healthcare is a Legal Duty, Inc. v.
Vladeck,2 1 1 the court considered an establishment clause challenge to
certain exemptions for Christian Science sanitoria from Medicare and
Medicaid regulatory standards. 2 12 Noting that the exemption favored
only one religious belief, the court held that the provision must be
strictly scrutinized.2 13 Although the exemption furthered a compel-
ling state interest, it was not narrowly tailored to that interest be-
cause it was under-inclusive. 2 14 Other religious groups could
conceivably have qualified for the exemption under the rationale given
for its enactment and yet only Christian Scientists were exempted.21 5
The Vladeck court also observed that the enactment of the exemption
in an effort to accommodate the free exercise of religious belief did not
save it from constitutional defect.2 1 6 The court opined that "even the
most honorable of intentions cannot cure the constitutional defect.
The general interest of religious accommodation is consistent with the
values supporting the First Amendment; this particular manner of ac-
commodation is not."2 17
There are a few cases addressing the constitutionality of a religious
exemption to the Social Security Act that are inconsistent with Larson
and Grant.21 8 The Social Security Act exemption permits religious
self-employed individuals to avoid paying social security taxes if they
are members of a recognized religious sect which adheres to estab-
lished teachings against any system of government-sponsored welfare
payments, provided that the religious sect makes sufficient provision
for its dependent members. 21 9 Some courts have rejected claims that
the group membership requirement for a religious exemption violated
209. See id.
210. See id.
211. 938 F. Supp. 1466 (D. Minn. 1996).
212. See id. at 1468.
213. See id. at 1473-74.
214. See id. at 1479-81.
215. See id. at 1474.
216. See id. at 1480.
217. Id.
218. See Droz v. Commissioner, 48 F.3d 1120 (9th Cir. 1995); Bethel Baptist Church v.
United States, 822 F.2d 1334 (3d Cir. 1987); Jaggard v. Commissioner, 582 F.2d
1189 (8th Cir. 1978). Cf United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 260-61 (1982)(refer-
ring to exemptions to the Social Security law, but not in the context of an estab-
lishment clause challenge).
219. See 26 U.S.C. § 1402(g) (1994).
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the Establishment Clause by discriminating among various religious
beliefs.220
These cases are questionable because they contradict the Supreme
Court's view that exemptions which favor some religious beliefs over
others are facially discriminatory.2 21 Had these courts followed Grant
and Larson, they would have held that the facially discriminatory ex-
emptions triggered strict scrutiny review. Perhaps these courts could
have legitimately upheld the exemption scheme in the Social Security
Act given the compelling governmental interest in providing a finan-
cial safety net for the nation's elderly and infirm. 2 22 However, as will
be explained in Part V below, the government has no such compelling
interest in forcing religious objectors to rent to unmarried couples.2 23
When a state exempts only some religious organizations or land-
lords from its fair housing law, the state improperly exalts their reli-
gious beliefs over the beliefs of others. Under Larson and Grant, these
exemptions are facially discriminatory and must be subjected to strict
scrutiny review. 22 4
B. Alternative Federal Constitutional Claims
In Employment Division v. Smith, the Court suggested that strict
scrutiny review may apply in cases presenting a "hybrid" claim, where
the free exercise claim is coupled with some other constitutional
claim.22 5 No Supreme Court case since Employment Division v. Smith
has involved a hybrid claim, although a few federal courts have inter-
preted the Court's "hybrid" language to justify strict scrutiny review
220. See cases cited in supra note 218.
221. See Grant v. Washington Pub. Employment Relations Comm'n, 456 U.S. 955
(1982); Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 252-54 (1982). Indeed, one court did not
even acknowledge Grant or Larson. See Bethel Baptist Church v. United States,
822 F.2d 1334, 1342 (3d Cir. 1987).
222. See, e.g., United States v. Lee, 458 U.S. 252, 258-61 (1982) (refusing to grant a
religious exemption to the duty to pay Social Security taxes due to the importance
of the Social Security system).
223. See supra Part V.
224. It ultimately makes no difference whether the court subjects the exemptions
alone, or the provision requiring landlords to rent to unmarried couples, to strict
scrutiny review. To evaluate the constitutionality of the exemptions, the court
must analyze the purpose of the provision that protects unmarried couples to
determine whether the exemptions are sufficiently, narrowly drawn to achieve
the statute's purpose. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1982). The
state could cure its violation of the Establishment Clause and the free exercise
neutrality/general applicability standard in two ways. First, it could exempt all,
not just some, religious objectors. This approach would resolve the dispute that
is the subject of this Article. Second, it could eliminate all exemptions. This ap-
proach would resolve the Establishment Clause and neutrality/general applica-
bility issues. As sections IV.B and IV.C infra explain, however, the landlord may
have other avenues to strict scrutiny review.
225. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881-82 (1990).
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under the free exercise clause.226 The ambiguity of the hybrid lan-
guage in Employment Division v. Smith has generated a significant
debate. Under one view, this hybrid theory suggests a reinvigoration
of the Sherbert free exercise analysis in cases where a free exercise
claim is coupled with some other important claim.2 2 7 The fact that
the Court cited Yoder as an example of a hybrid claim and never ex-
plicitly repudiated Sherbert and its progeny22s lends some support to
this view. Under the contrary view, the Court's hybrid language sim-
ply reflects that strict scrutiny review was applied in earlier decisions
only because of the other fundamental claim raised, and not under the
Free Exercise Clause.229
The Court's hybrid language may have been a futile attempt to rec-
oncile the irreconcilable differences between Employment Division v.
Smith and the Sherbert line of cases. Justice Souter summed this
point up well in his concurring opinion in City of Hialeah:
If a hybrid claim is simply one in which another constitutional right is impli-
cated, then the hybrid exception would probably be so vast as to swallow the
Smith rule, and, indeed, the hybrid exception would cover the situation exem-
plified by Smith, since free speech and associational rights are certainly impli-
cated in the peyote ritual. But if a hybrid claim is one in which a litigant
would actually obtain an exemption from a formally neutral, generally appli-
cable law under another constitutional provision, then there would have been
no reason for the Court in what Smith calls the hybrid cases to have men-
tioned the Free Exercise Clause at all.23
0
Regardless of whether the hybrid theory is a viable means of ob-
taining strict scrutiny review under the Free Exercise Clause, there
are two other federal constitutional claims that may be relevant to
disputes between landlords and excluded unmarried couples.
226. See, e.g., Brown v. Hot, Sexy & Safer Prods., Inc., 68 F.3d 525, 539 (lst Cir.
1995)(acknowledging the hybrid theory but holding that it had not been shown);
American Friends Serv. Comm. Corp. v. Thornburgh, 941 F.2d 808, 810-11 (9th
Cir. 1991)(hybrid theory not met in instant case).
227. See Stein, supra note 6, at 172-79 (describing the "additive" and "signaling" theo-
ries postulated in support of hybrid claims); Gary Stuart McCaleb, Comment, A
Century of Free Exercise Jurisprudence: Don't Practice What You Preach, 9 RE-
GENT U. L. Rxv. 253, 272-74 (1997)(describing the view that the Court's hybrid
theory suggests a reinvigoration of the Sherbert free exercise analysis).
228. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 881, 883-84 (1990).
229. See James R. Mason, I, Comment, Smith's Free Exercise "Hybrids" Rooted in
Non-Free Exercise Soil, 6 REGENT U. L. Rav. 201, 254-57 (1995)(explaining at
length why it is highly unlikely that the Court intended the hybrid language in
Employment Division v. Smith to create a new method of obtaining strict scrutiny
review under the Free Exercise Clause).
230. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 567
(1993)(Souter, J., concurring).
1998]
NEBRASKA LAW REVIEW
1. Free Speech
Although the landlord's free speech rights are not usually impli-
cated in the typical dispute with spurned unmarried cohabitants, in
two cases the government clearly infringed the landlord's free speech
rights.
In Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission,2 3 1 a land-
lord objected on religious grounds to renting to an unmarried
couple.23 2 The couple filed a complaint with the California Fair Em-
ployment and Housing Commission, and the commission subsequently
entered a cease and desist order and imposed civil penalties on the
landlord.2 33 The commission further required the landlord to post and
distribute to prospective tenants provisions of the state fair housing
law and notice of the landlord's previous violation and current full
compliance with the law.23 4 When the landlord challenged this notice
requirement on appeal, the commission offered to remove it.235
The commission was wise to make this offer. In Hurley v. Irish-
American Gay, Lesbian and Bisexual Group,236 a group of gays, lesbi-
ans, and bisexuals sued the organizers of a parade for allegedly violat-
ing the Massachusetts public accommodation law by not allowing the
group to participate in the parade.2 37 Because the organizers objected
to the message that the group would convey by participating, they ar-
gued that the state would violate the organizers' free speech rights if it
forced them to include the group in the parade.2 3s In holding for the
organizers, a unanimous Supreme Court stated:
Since all speech inherently involves choices of what to say and what to leave
unsaid, one important manifestation of the principle of free speech is that one
who chooses to speak may also decide what not to say. Although the State
may at times prescribe what shall be orthodox in commercial advertising by
requiring dissemination of purely factual and uncontroversial information,
outside that context it may not compel affirmance of a belief with which the
speaker disagrees. Indeed, this general rule, that the speaker has the right to
tailor the speech, applies not only to expressions of value, opinion, or endorse-
ment, but equally to statements of fact the speaker would rather avoid ....
Nor is the rule's benefit restricted to the press, being enjoyed by business cor-
porations generally and by ordinary people engaged in unsophisticated ex-
pression as well as by professional publishers. Its point is simply the point of
all speech protection, which is to shield just those choices of content that in
someone's eyes are misguided, or even hurtful.
2 3 9
231. 913 P.2d 909 (Cal. 1996)(plurality opinion).
232. See id. at 912.
233. See id. at 914.
234. See id.
235. See id. at 921 n.15.
236. 515 U.S. 557 (1995).
237. See id. at 560-61.
238. See id. at 566.
239. Id. at 573-74 (citations and internal quotation marks omitted); see also Pacific
Gas & Elec. Co. v. Public Utilities Comm'n, 475 U.S. 1, 9 (1985)(holding that state
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Similarly, in Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commission,2 40
two Christian landlords objected to state and local laws that required
them to forego expressing their religious objections to renting to un-
married cohabitants.24 1 The Ninth Circuit held that the state and lo-
cal laws proscribed religious speech, which enjoys plenary First
Amendment protection. 24 2
Because the state's burden when defending against a free speech
claim is essentially the same as under a free exercise claim,24 3 this
alternative theory may provide a landlord another means to obtain
strict scrutiny review. As the commission's reaction in Smith v. Fair
Employment & Housing Commission suggests, a knowledgeable state
commission will not likely impose such a notice requirement and
thereby risk facing a free speech claim that could give rise to a hybrid
argument under the free exercise clause. States can certainly ensure
compliance with their fair housing laws without this notice require-
ment. If state actors nevertheless insist on restricting the speech
rights of religious landlords, the landlords will have viable free speech
claims.
2. Takings
One commentator has argued that the "right to exclude" described
in the Court's takings cases may be combined with a free exercise ar-
gument to present a hybrid claim on behalf of religious landlords.244
Although the California court provided little detail in its dismissal of
the landlord's claim,2 45 this hybrid argument was apparently made in
Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission. This argument is
both internally consistent and in accord with general concepts of prop-
erty law, but a unanimous Supreme Court recently eviscerated it.246
utilities commission could not force utility to mail out a third party's newsletter,
noting that '[clompeled access like that ordered in this case both penalizes the
expression of particular points of view and forces speakers to alter their speech to
conform with an agenda they do not set"); Wooley v. Maynard, 430 U.S. 705
(1977) (holding that the state violated objecting citizens' free speech rights by
forcing them to display the state's motto on their license plates).
240. Nos. 97-35220 & 97-35221, 1999 WL 11337 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999).
241. See id. at *8.
242. See id. at *18 (citing Lamb's Chapel v. Center Moriches Union Free Sch. Dist.,
508 U.S. 384, 393-94 (1993))
243. See, e.g., International Soc'y for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. Lee, 505 U.S. 672,
678 (1992)(restrictions on speech will survive only if they are narrowly drawn to
achieve a compelling state interest).
244. See Stein, supra note 6, at 169-72, 180-95 (citing Dolan v. City of Tigard, 512 U.S.
374 (1994); Kaiser Aetna v. United States, 444 U.S. 164 (1979)).
245. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P. 2d 909, 921 & n.15 (Cal.
1996)(plurality opinion).
246. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519 (1992).
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In Yee v. City of Escondido,247 the Court held that a rent control
ordinance that required mobile home park owners to continue to rent
to certain tenants did not effect a per se taking.2 48 The Court noted
that the landlords had willingly entered the market and thus were not
being forced to rent.24 9 Rather, the law merely required the landlords
to rent to certain specified tenants.25 0 The Court explicitly rejected
the landlords' argument that the law infringed on the right to exclude
and therefore constituted a taking.2 5 1
Yee can be criticized for the Court's failure to appreciate basic prin-
ciples of landlord and tenant law. The Court based its decision on a
case involving a motel.25 2 A transaction to stay in a motel, however,
involves a mere license which is not a property interest.2 53 By con-
trast, a lease involves the creation and conveyance of a non-freehold
estate, a property interest which gives the tenant the right to exclu-
sive possession. 25 4 A landlord gives up the right to possess his prop-
erty while a motel owner can recover possession at any time.25 5 Thus,
a landlord's property rights are more greatly infringed when he is
forced to rent than are a motel owner's rights when he is forced to
open a room to someone.
If the hybrid language in Employment Division v. Smith does cre-
ate a distinct theory to achieve strict scrutiny review under the Free
Exercise Clause, then the Court's questionable decision in Yee elimi-
nates one important claim for landlords. If there is no distinct hybrid
theory, however, Yee does not greatly affect these landlords because a
takings claim alone would not achieve their ultimate goal. The rem-
edy for a taking is "just compensation."2 56 Religious landlords do not
want just compensation for lost property rights; they want protection
of religious liberty and of the right not to rent to unmarried couples.
Thus, the impact of Yee ultimately depends on whether there is a hy-
brid theory to support strict scrutiny review under the Free Exercise
Clause.257
247. Id.
248. See id. at 539.
249. See id. at 527.
250. See id. at 528-29.
251. See id. at 532.
252. See id. at 529, 531 (citing Heart of Atlanta Motel, Inc. v. United States, 379 U.S.
241 (1964)).
253. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 19, §6.2, at 250-51, §6.6, at 254.
254. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
255. CUNNINGHAM ET AL., supra note 19, §6.2, at 250-51, §6.6, at 254.
256. See, e.g., Nollan v. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 U.S. 825, 842 (1987).
257. In Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, the Ninth Circuit held that
Alaska state and local laws that required landlords to rent to unmarried couples
constituted a regulatory taking that supported a hybrid free exercise claim. See
Nos. 97-35200 & 97-35221, 1999 WL 11337, at *13-15 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999).
While the court's analysis in Thomas is sound in several respects (see, e.g., sec-
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C. State Free Exercise Claims
A state constitution may protect free exercise rights more vigor-
ously than the First Amendment does.258 In the aftermath of Employ-
ment Division v. Smith, several commentators urged state courts to
give heightened, independent attention to their state's free exercise
clause as an alternative means of attaining strict scrutiny review in
cases involving religious objectors.259 A state free exercise claim is
potentially valuable to a religious landlord because it offers the hope
of an exemption from the law, which is the landlord's ultimate goal.
Because the states' free exercise clauses vary widely,260 some state
constitutions may support exemptions to state fair housing laws while
others may not.
A state court should not summarily reject Employment Division v.
Smith and declare that the Sherbert/Yoder strict scrutiny approach is
the law of the state. The proper role of the court is to ascertain the
tion IV.B.1 supra and section IV.C.2 and Part V infra), the court's takings analy-
sis is curious at best. The Supreme Court has clearly rejected the notion that
laws requiring landlords to rent to certain classes of tenants impermissibly in-
fringe the landlords' right to exclude. See Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519,
532 (1992). To effect a regulatory taking, a law must so regulate the property
that it "goes too far" in infringing the owner's proeprty rights. See Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal Council, 505 U.S. 1003, 1015 (1992). State fair housing laws
like those in Alaska do not physically intrude on the landlord's property but sim-
ply require that, once the landlord decides to rent premises, he may not exclude
certain classes of people. Moreover, according to Yee, these laws do not take away
any part of the landlord's bundle of rights. If these laws take away no property
right, then by definition they do not go too far in infringing the landlord's prop-
erty rights. Finally, these laws enlarge the landlord's pool of prospective tenants
and thus, if anything, make his property potentially more valuable. For these
reasons, as long as the Supreme Court adheres to its analysis in Yee, the holding
in Thomas on the takings issue is questionable and thus is unlikely to be widely
accepted. As explained above, in Yee, the Supreme Court misapplied basic princi-
ples of property law. See supra notes 247-56 and accompanying text. Had the
Court correctly understood the distinction between a leasehold and an agreement
to allow a guest to stay in a motel, it would have held that laws requiring land-
lords to rent to certain classes of tenants infringe the landlords' right to exclude.
258. See City of Mesquite v. Aladdin's Castle, Inc., 455 U.S. 283, 293 (1982)("[A] state
court is free to read its own constitution more broadly than this Court reads the
Federal Constitution, or to reject the mode of analysis used by this Court in favor
of a different analysis of its own corresponding constitutional guarantee.").
259. See Angela C. Carmella, State Constitutional Protection of Religious Exercise: An
Emerging Post-Smith Jurisprudence, 1993 B.Y.U. L. REv. 275 (1993); Tracey
Levy, Rediscovering Rights: State Courts Reconsider the Free Exercise Clauses of
Their Own Constitutions in the Wake of Employment Division v. Smith, 67 TmnP.
L. REv. 1017 (1994); Neil McCabe, The State and Federal Religion Clauses: Differ-
ences of Degree and Kind, 5 ST. THoAiAs L. REv. 49 (1992); Stuart G. Parsell,
Note, Revitalization of the Free Exercise of Religion Under State Constitutions: A
Response to Employment Division v. Smith, 68 NOTRE D A L. Ray. 747 (1993).
260. See generally Carmella, supra note 259, at 293-305, 321 (describing various reli-
gious liberty clauses of state constitutions).
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original meaning of the state's religion clause based on the distinctive
wording, origins and character of the state constitution.261 In some
states, the religious liberty clause mirrors the First Amendment. 2 62
In those jurisdictions, if the state court is persuaded that Employment
Division v. Smith was correctly decided, as some commentators be-
lieve,26 3 and if the state constitution was deliberately patterned after
the First Amendment, then state law may protect religious liberty in
the same manner as Employment Division v. Smith.2 64
The text of a state constitutional provision may suggest the intent
to protect more religiously motivated conduct than Employment Divi-
sion v. Smith's narrow protection of worship and related activities. 26 5
For example, many state constitutions broadly insulate the rights of
conscience from state intrusion.2 66 Others refer more generally to the
liberty, or rights, of conscience secured by the state constitution. 2 67
This protection of rights of conscience may suggest that the state can-
not enforce a law in a way that would require a citizen to violate his
conscience. The history of the drafting of the free exercise clause may
261. See G. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation,
22 RUTGERS L.J. 841, 855-61 (1991) (advocating an interpretive approach of as-
certaining original intent based on the context and character of the state
constitution).
262. See ALAsKA CONST. art. I, § 4; FLA. CONST. art. I, § 3; HAw. CONST. art. I, § 4; IOWA
CONsT. art. I, § 3; LA. CONST. art. I, § 8; MASS. CONST. art. 46, § 1; MoNT. CONST.
art. II, § 5; S.C. CONST. art. I, § 2. Cf VA. CONsT. art. I, § 16 ("[AIll men are
equally entitled to the free exercise of religion, according to the dictates of
conscience.").
263. See, e.g., Marshall, supra note 140, at 326; Titus, supra note 135, at 10-13, 52-63.
But see McConnell, supra note 132, at 1511-17 (arguing that the Framers in-
tended the free exercise clause generally to allow for exemptions from laws re-
quiring religious objectors to violate their conscience).
264. Cf Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 280-81 (Alaska
1994)(distinguishing Employment Division v. Smith and applying the Sherbert
standard without explaining why the Alaska constitution should be construed
differently than the identical language of the First Amendment to the United
States Constitution); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235-36 (Mass.
1994)(interpreting state constitution under Sherbert standard).
265. See Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 877-78 (1990) (noting that the state
may not regulate conduct simply because it is motivated by religious belief).
266. See ARK. CONST. art. II, § 24; CONN. CONST. art. VII; DEL. CoNsT. art. I, § 1; IND.
CONsT. art. I, §§ 2,3; KAN. CONST. B. of R. § 7; Ky. CONST. § 5; ME. CONST. art. I,
§ 3; MICH. CONST. art. I, § 4; MINN. CONST. art. I, § 16; Mo. CONST. art. I, § 5; NEB.
CONsT. art. I, § 4; N.H. CONST. pt.1, art. 5; N.J. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.M. CONST.
art. II, § 11; N.C. CONST. art. I, § 13; OHIO CONsT. art. I, § 7; OR. CONST. art. I,
§§ 2, 3; PA. CONST. art. I, § 3; R.I. CONST. art. I, § 3; S.D. CONST. art. VI, § 3;
TENN. CONST. art. I, § 3; TEx. CONST. art. I, § 3; UTAH CONST. art. 1, § 4; VT.
CONST. ch. I, art. 3; WASH. CONST. art. I, § 11; Wis. CONST. art. I, § 18.
267. See ARiZ. CONST. art. II, § 12; CAL. CONST. art. I, § 4; COLO. CONST. art. II, § 4;
IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 4; ILL. CONST. art. I, § 3; Miss. CONST. art. III, § 18; NEv.
CONST. art. I, § 4; N.Y. CONST. art. I, § 3; N.D. CONsT. art. I, § 3; Wyo. CONST. art.
I, § 18.
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support the view that this protection of conscience exceeds the protec-
tion guaranteed by the Free Exercise Clause of the First Amend-
ment.2 68 Although early drafts of the Free Exercise Clause included
explicit protection of the rights of conscience, the Framers deleted this
provision from the final text.26 9 The framers of state constitutions
therefore may have inserted a clause explicitly protecting the rights of
conscience to provide protection they knew the Federal Free Exercise
Clause did not give.27 0 Similarly, other state constitutions protect cit-
izens from being "molested" in person or property because of religious
beliefs or opinions. 2 71 This language likewise may protect religiously
motivated conduct, including that of religious landlords whose prop-
erty rights are clearly affected in these cases. Several state courts
have held that Employment Division v. Smith is inconsistent with
their state constitution and thus have applied a strict scrutiny analy-
sis to determine if religious objectors are entitled to an exemption
from an otherwise valid law.2 72
268. See Titus, supra note 135, at 52-56 (explaining how a phrase protecting the
"rights of conscience" was removed from earlier drafts of the First Amendment,
and how the revisions to the text reflect that the Free Exercise Clause does not
generally protect individual conscience). But see McConnell, supra note 132, at
1488-1500 (arguing that the Free Exercise Clause protects individual conscience
despite the deletion of explicit protection of the rights of conscience from the
text).
269. See Titus, supra note 135, at 53.
270. See State v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397-98 (Minn. 1990) (stating that the
state constitutional protection of conscience provides more protection than the
federal Free Exercise Clause); First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d
174, 185-87 (Wash. 1992)(state constitution provides more protection than Fed-
eral Free Exercise Clause); State v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 238-40 (Wis.
1996)(state constitution provides more protection than Federal Free Exercise
Clause). But see State v. Loudon, 857 S.W.2d 878, 882-83 (Tenn. Crim. App.
1993)(holding that the state constitutional protection of conscience did not relieve
an objector from complying with a neutral, generally applicable law).
271. See GA. CONsT. art. I, § I para. IV; MD. CoNsT. art. 36; MASS. CONST. art. II; OKLA.
CONST. art. I, § 2; W. VA. CONsT. art. Ill, § 15.
272. See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 280-82
(Alaska 1994); Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Conm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32,
38-41 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed,
859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993)(not published in official reporter and cannot be cited in
California); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235-36 (Mass. 1994); State
v. Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d 393, 397-98 (Minn. 1990); State v. French, 460
N.W.2d 2, 8-9 (Minn. 1990); First Covenant Church v. City of Seattle, 840 P.2d
174, 185-87 (Wash. 1992); Wisconsin v. Miller, 549 N.W.2d 235, 238-40 (Wis.
1996). Cf. Rupert v. City of Portland, 605 A.2d 63, 65-66 (Me. 1992)(explaining
that strict scrutiny review applies when a person challenges a governmental reg-
ulation as a violation of the Free Exercise Clause of the Maine Constitution);
Porth v. Roman Catholic Diocese, 532 N.W.2d 195, 198-99 (Mich. Ct. App.
1995)(deferring consideration of whether the state free exercise clause provides
more protection than the federal Free Exercise Clause); Hunt v. Hunt, 648 A.2d
843, 852-53 (Vt. 1994)(explaining that free exercise claims under the Vermont
Constitution are subject to strict scrutiny review). Although the wording of the
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If a state free exercise claim is a viable option, the landlord must
prove that he holds a sincere religious belief, as opposed to a mere
personal opinion or conviction, which the law substantially
burdens.273
1. Sincerely Held Religious Belief
It will not be difficult for a landlord to prove that he has a sincerely
held religious belief that compels him to exclude unmarried couples.
This burden is imposed only to insure that an objector honestly bases
his objection on principles of faith and not on personal preferences or
secular ideologies:
A way of life, however virtuous and admirable, may not be interposed as a
barrier to reasonable state regulation... if it is based on purely secular con-
siderations; to have the protection of the Religion Clauses, the claims must be
rooted in religious belief. Although a determination of what is a "religious"
belief or practice entitled to constitutional protection may present a most deli-
cate question, the very concept of ordered liberty precludes allowing every per-
son to make his own standards on matters of conduct in which society as a
whole has important interests. 2 7 4
In employing this test, the court may make sure that the belief is
in fact grounded in a particular religious belief.2 75 However, the court
may not speculate as to the truth of the belief or question whether the
majority of the proponents of the faith at issue adhere to that
belief.276
state constitution may require a unique test, in cases where a state court has
determined that its constitution explicitly protects conscience-based conduct, the
courts have applied the SherbertlYoder strict scrutiny analysis or some close va-
riation of it. See Swanner, 874 P.2d at 281-82; Donahue, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 38-41;
Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 235-36; Hershberger, 462 N.W.2d at 397-98; French, 460
N.W.2d at 8-9; First Covenant Church, 840 P.2d at 185-87; Miller, 549 N.W.2d at
238-40. Cf. McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Mich. 1998)(applying the
SherbertlYoder strict scrutiny analysis under the Michigan constitution but not
explaining why the court did so). Thus, the analysis in Part V, infra, presumes
that the Sherbert/Yoder compelling state interest standard will govern any strict
scrutiny analysis under a state free exercise claim. This analysis should also be
relevant to any unique test that may apply.
273. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 403-04 (1963). If the landlord meets this burden, then the burden shifts to
the state to prove that the law furthers a compelling governmental interest and is
the least restrictive means of furthering that interest. The landlord's burden is
unique to a free exercise claim. See Yoder, 406 U.S. at 214-25; Sherbert, 374 U.S.
at 403, 407-09. The state's burden is discussed in Part V, infra.
274. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-16 (1972)(footnote omitted).
275. See id. at 216 ("[Wle see that the record in this case abundantly supports the
claim that the traditional way of life of the Amish is not merely a matter of per-
sonal preference, but one of deep religious conviction . . ").
276. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 715-16 (1981); see also Smith v. Fair
Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 923 (Cal. 1996)(plurality opin-
ion)(holding that the landlord's religious belief was sincere even though the hier-
archy of a particular denomination allegedly did not agree with it).
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In the reported cases to date, the landlords who would not rent to
unmarried couples for religious reasons have been devout Christians,
some Protestant, others Roman Catholic. 277 Although no court has
questioned the sincerity of the landlord's religious beliefs,278 some
commentators have characterized the beliefs as extreme or unu-
sual.2 79 To the contrary, the belief that fornication is wrong is firmly
supported by Scriptural texts and by the Catechism of the Catholic
Church.
The Old Testament teaches that, in the nation of Israel, adultery
and sodomy were punishable by death.2s0 Fortunately for fornicators,
they were treated more leniently. If a man and woman had inter-
course outside of marriage, the man had to pay a bride price to the
woman's father, who would then decide if the couple must marry.2 8 '
The principle that sexual intercourse may properly occur only within
marriage is also reflected in a traditional Orthodox blessing for a Jew-
ish betrothal:
Blessed art thou, Lord our God, King of the universe, who hast sanctified us
with thy commandments, and prohibited illicit relations; thou hast forbidden
the cohabitation of those who are merely betrothed, permitting it to those who
are married through consecrated wedlock. Blessed art thou, 0 Lord, who
sanctifiest thy people Israel by consecrated wedlock.2 82
277. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, Nos. 97-35220 & 97-35221, 1999
WL 11337, at *1 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999)(Christian); Swanner v. Anchorage Equal
Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 276-77 (Alaska 1994)(Christian); Smith v. Fair
Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 912 (Cal. 1996)(plurality opinion)
(Presbyterian); Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d
32, 33 n.1 (Ct. App. 1991)(Roman Catholic), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal.
1992), review dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993)(not published in official re-
porter and cannot be cited in California); Jasniowski v. Rushing, 678 N.E.2d 743,
745 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997)(no denominational affiliation identified but objection
based on the Bible), vacated, 685 N.E.2d 622 (Ml. 1997); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets,
636 N.E.2d 233, 234 (Mass. 1994)(Roman Catholic); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d
2, 3-4 (Minn. 1990)(Evangelical Free). Cf. McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d. 723,
725 (Mich. 1998)(no denominational affiliation or source of religious beliefs
described).
278. Even the Supreme Court of Alaska, which otherwise strained to rule against the
religious landlord in Swanner, held that the landlord met the threshold require-
ment of establishing that a sincere religious belief prompted his conduct. See
Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 281-82 (Alaska
1994).
279. See, e.g., Markey, The Price, supra note 6, at 702, 752, 822 (referring to the belief
that fornication is immoral as "religious zealotry," "atavistic" and "arbitrary").
280. See Leviticus 20:10, 13.
281. See Exodus 22:16-17; Deuteronomy 22:28-29. See generally Roger Bern, A Bibli-
cal Model for Analysis of Issues of Law and Public Policy, 6 REGENT L. REv. 103,
185-86 (1995).
282. PHIn BmNBAum, A BOOK OF JEWISH CONCEPTS 424 (1964).
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The New Testament likewise prohibits sexual relations outside of
marriage. The Scriptures refer to fornication 28 3 as behavior that de-
files the participant, 28 4 separates one from God,285 flows from a de-
praved mind,28 6 and deserves judgment. 28 7 Saint Paul contrasted
various sins, or "works of the flesh," including fornication, with the
"fruit of the Spirit," which includes such things as love, joy and
peace. 28 8 He specifically instructed and exhorted Christians not to en-
gage in sexual relations outside of marriage. 28 9
The Catechism of the Catholic Church reinforces these Scriptural
teachings. It explains that all people who are baptized are called to
lead a chaste life in accordance with their particular stage of life.290
Such chastity includes abstaining from all sexual conduct outside of
marriage. 2 9 1 The Catechism makes it plain that one cooperates in the
sins of others by either not exercising one's authority to hinder those
sins or by protecting those who engage in sin.2 92 It also directly pros-
cribes fornication and unmarried cohabitation:
Fornication is carnal union between an unmarried man and an unmarried
woman. It is gravely contrary to the dignity of persons and of human sexual-
ity which is naturally ordered to the good of spouses and the generation and
education of children.
In a so-called free union, a man and a woman refuse to give juridical and
public form to a liaison involving sexual intimacy.... [A free union] offend[s]
against the dignity of marriage; [it] destroy[s] the very idea of family; [it]
weaken[s] the sense of fidelity. [It is] contrary to the moral law. The sexual
act must take place exclusively within marriage. Outside of marriage it al-
283. Although "fornication" is used in the King James Version of the New Testament,
it is not used in all translations. For example, the New International Version
uses the phrase "sexual immorality." However, the operative Greek word is
porneia, which literally means harlotry, idolatry, and fornication. See JAMES
STRONG, Greek Dictionary of the New Testament, in THE EXHAUSTIVE CONCOR-
DANCE OF THE BIBLE para. 4202, at 59 (Abingdon-Cokesbury Press 1953)(1894).
"Fornication" is "sexual intercourse between a man and woman not married to
each other." WEBSTER'S H NEW RIVERSIDE UNIVERsITY DICTIONARY 499 (1984).
284. See Matthew 15:18-20.
285. See 1 Corinthians 6:9-7:5; Colossians 3:5-7.
286. See Romans 1:18-32.
287. See id.
288. See Galatians 5:19-25; see also CATECHISM OF THE CATHOLIC CHURCH para. 1852,
at 454 (Liguori Publications 1994)[hereinafter CATECHISM].
289. See 1 Corinthians 10:8-13; 1 Thessalonians 4:3-8.
290. See CATECHISM, supra note 288, para. 2348, at 564.
291. See id. para. 2352, at 564.
292. See id. para. 1868, at 457. This principle is consistent with the scriptural exhor-
tation to hate evil and to have nothing to do with it. See Psalm 101:4; Proverbs
8:13. Thus, one commentator is mistaken when she asserts that "a prohibition on
the facilitation of the assumed sexual acts of third parties is undoubtedly not a
central tenet of [Christian] religions." See Markey, The Price, supra note 6, at
819.
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ways constitutes a grave sin and excludes one from sacramental
communion. 2 9
3
The religious beliefs of the landlords who in reported decisions
have not rented to unmarried cohabitants are clearly rooted in historic
Judeo-Christian teachings.2 94 If an individual landlord sincerely be-
lieves in these teachings, or in similar principles of another faith, the
landlord will easily meet the burden of proving that the decision not to
rent to the couple was based on a sincere religious belief.
2. Substantial Burden
Once the landlord demonstrates the sincerity of his religious belief,
he must next show that forcing him to rent to unmarried cohabitants
will substantially burden his free exercise rights.295 As with the
sincerity test, a religious landlord should not have a difficult time
meeting this burden of proof. Generally, the landlord need only show
that the law favoring unmarried cohabitants forces him to either vio-
late deeply held convictions against facilitating immorality or to aban-
don the source of income derived from his rental properties, in some
cases his sole livelihood.296
The Supreme Court and commentators have made it clear that this
substantial burden test is not difficult to meet. Professor Laurence
Tribe has equated the substantial burden test with a mere showing
that there is a conflict between the law and the landlord's religious
beliefs.297 He has also noted that the focus of the substantial burden
inquiry is "the degree that the government's requirement will, directly
or indirectly, make the believer's religious duties more difficult or
more costly."2 98 The Supreme Court similarly has focused on the bur-
den the state places on the religious objector to either forego otherwise
lawful behavior or violate his religious beliefs:
Where the state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct pro-
scribed by a religious faith, or where it denies such a benefit because of con-
duct mandated by religious belief, thereby putting substantial pressure on an
293. CATECmSm, supra note 288, para. 2353, at 565, para. 2390, at 575.
294. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, Nos. 97-35220 & 97-35221, 1999
WL 11337, at *1 & nn.2 & 3 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999)(quoting Scriptures and citing
historic Christian commentaries to establish this point).
295. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215-19 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 403-04 (1963).
296. See, e.g., Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 947 (Cal.
1996)(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting)(noting that Smith was a widow
who derived her income largely from her rental properties).
297. See LAURENCE H. TRIBE, AERICAN CoNsTrruTIoNAL LAw § 14-12, at 1242 (2d ed.
1988)("In order to gain the exemption, the claimant must show (1) a sincerely
held religious belief, which (2) conflicts with, and thus is burdened by, the state
requirement."); see also Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 236-37 (Mass.
1994) (applying Professor's Tribe's standard for the substantial burden test).
298. TRBE, supra note 297, § 14-12, at 1247.
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adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs, a burden on religion
exists. While the compulsion may be indirect, the infringement upon free exer-
cise is nonetheless substantial. 2 9 9
Indeed, "[glovernmental imposition of such a choice puts the same
kind of burden upon the free exercise of religion as would a fine im-
posed against [a citizen] for her [Sabbath] worship."3 00
For example, in a case involving the denial of unemployment bene-
fits, the Court held that there was a substantial burden on the be-
liever's free exercise rights even though his beliefs did not compel him
to engage in the activity at issue. The Court found it determinative
that "the employee was forced to choose between fidelity to religious
belief and continued employment; the forfeiture of unemployment
benefits for choosing the former over the latter brings unlawful coer-
cion to bear on the employee's choice." 3 01
Likewise, when the government requires religious landlords to vio-
late their faith by renting to unmarried cohabitants, it substantially
burdens their free exercise rights because it "conditions receipt of an
important benefit,"302 or the right to engage in the rental housing
business, "upon conduct proscribed by a religious faith."303 The law
therefore puts substantial pressure on these landlords to modify their
beliefs. In fact, they arguably face substantially more government co-
ercion than the employees seeking unemployment benefits in the
Sherbert line of cases did. Those employees lost only the opportunity
to receive a government payment. In cases involving alleged fair
housing violations, landlords could face pressure to abandon their
business and lose income, as well as legal action such as cease-and-
desist orders, civil and criminal penalties, or even imprisonment. 3 04
The mere fact that a religious landlord would ignore such daunting
disincentives and continue to defend his religious principles through-
out the court system should alone attest to the substantial burden
that has been placed on his free exercise rights.
299. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981); see also Hobbie v. Unemploy-
ment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987) (employee's free exercise rights
were substantially burdened where the employee was forced to choose between
fidelity to religious belief and continued employment); Sherbert v. Verner, 374
U.S. 398, 405-06 (1963)(noting that infringement upon free exercise is substan-
tial where a state conditions receipt of an important benefit upon conduct pro-
scribed by a religious faith).
300. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 404 (1963).
301. Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144 (1987).
302. Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717 (1981).
303. Id.
304. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 954 (Cal.
1996)(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636
N.E.2d 233, 240 (Mass. 1994).
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The weight of authority in the landlord and tenant cases is consis-
tent with the above analysis. In Attorney General v. Desilets, the
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts held that
the government has placed a burden on the defendants that makes their exer-
cise of religion more difficult .... The statute affirmatively obliges the de-
fendants to enter into a contract contrary to their religious beliefs and
provides significant sanctions for its violation. Moreover, both their noncon-
formity to the law and any related publicity may stigmatize the defendants in
the eyes of many and thus burden the exercise of the defendants' religion.
3 0 5
The Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit likewise recently held that
Alaska state and local laws which required landlords to rent to un-
married couples substantially burdened the religious beliefs of two
Christian landlords who objected to the laws.3 0 6 Similarly, in Jasni-
owski v. Rushing, the Illinois Appellate Court emphasized that the
"substantial burden is defined by [the landlord's] 'either-or' choice to
comply with the ordinance or adhere to his religious convictions, not
merely by its economic impact."3 07
The burden on the landlords' free exercise rights should be beyond
dispute. Nonetheless, two recent opinions provide some support for
the contrary view. In Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commis-
sion, a plurality of the California Supreme Court held that the state's
marital status discrimination law did not substantially burden a land-
lord's free exercise rights.30 The Supreme Court of Alaska reached a
similar conclusion in Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Commis-
sion.3 0 9 Each decision has limited value as precedent for the substan-
tial burden issue. In Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing
Commission, only three justices joined in the plurality's substantial
burden analysis.3 10 Because this opinion was rendered by a mere plu-
305. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 237-38 (Mass. 1994)(footnote omitted).
306. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, Nos. 97-35220 & 97-35221, 1999
WL 11337, at *26 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999).
307. Jasniowski v. Rushing, 678 N.E.2d 743, 749 (Il. App. Ct. 1997), vacated on other
grounds, 685 N.E.2d 622 (Il. 1997); see also Donahue v. Fair Employment &
Hous. Comn'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32,42-44 (Ct. App. 1991), review granted, 825 P.2d
766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed, 859 P.2d 671 (Cal. 1993)(not published in offi-
cial reporter and cannot be cited in California); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8
(Minn. 1990)("It is unreasonably cynical to say that [the landlord's] choice is sim-
ple: that he need not rent at all. Economic necessity may require him to seek
rental income and this may be as critical to him as the need for wage income
308. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 925 (Cal.
1996)(plurality opinion).
309. 874 P.2d 274, 283-84 (Alaska 1994).
310. While concurring in the plurality's refusal to exempt the landlord from the state
fair housing law on religious grounds, Justice Mosk limited his opinion to the
unconstitutionality of the federal Religious Freedom and Restoration Act. Jus-
tice Mosk specifically opined that it would be unconstitutional for the court to
engage in a substantial burden analysis. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous.
Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 937-39 (Cal. 1996) (Mosk, J., concurring). Justice Mosk
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rality, it lacks authority as precedent in California.31 1 As for Swan-
ner, the Alaska Supreme Court did not directly apply a substantial
burden test. Rather, the court addressed the landlord's burden within
its discussion of the landlord's behavior as a threat to public safety in
relation to the state's compelling interest in enforcement of the fair
housing law. 3 12 The Alaska court did not grapple with well-estab-
lished Supreme Court precedent regarding the substantial burden
analysis.3 13 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit, which encompasses both
Alaska and California, recently reached the opposite conclusion on the
substantial burden issue.3 14 Although both Smith v. Fair Employ-
ment & Housing Commission and Swanner are of limited precedential
value on the substantial burden issue, they likely will generate some
attention in future cases. Upon close examination, the analysis in
both opinions is muddled and patently inconsistent with Supreme
Court precedent.
The California plurality held that the landlord's free exercise
rights were not substantially burdened partially because the landlord
had the option of getting out of the rental business and "redeploying
the capital in other investments."315 The plurality explained that the
transaction costs of such reinvestment did not constitute a substantial
burden but merely made the practice of the landlord's religion more
expensive. 3 16 The plurality analogized the landlord's burden to that
of the plaintiffs in Jimmy Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equaliza-
tion,3 17 and Braunfeld v. Brown.31s In Swaggert, the Court rejected
the argument that a state sales tax on religious materials substan-
tially burdened a religious group's free exercise rights because it re-
duced the amount of money available for religious activities. 3 19 In
therefore did not indicate how he would have analyzed the substantial burden
issue had he thought it appropriate to do so. Also, he limited his discussion en-
tirely to federal free exercise law and thus did not address whether the California
Constitution might require a strict scrutiny analysis. See id. at 931-39.
311. See Board of Supervisors v. Local Agency Formation Comm'n, 838 P.2d 1198,
1207 (Cal. 1992).
312. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 281-84 (Alaska
1994).
313. See id. at 283 (briefly discussing United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252 (1982)).
Although the "threat to public safety" standard is not directly applicable under
Sherbert and its progeny, this standard concerns the nature of the state interest
and thus should overlap substantially with the federal compelling interest
standard.
314. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, Nos. 97-35220 & 97-35221, 1999
WL 11337, at *19-21 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999).
315. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 925 (Cal. 1996)(plu-
rality opinion).
316. See id. at 926-27.
317. 493 U.S. 378 (1990).
318. 366 U.S. 599 (1961).
319. See Swaggart Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990).
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Braunfeld, the Court ruled that applying Sunday closing laws to Jew-
ish businessmen merely imposed an economic disadvantage that did
not constitute a substantial burden on their religious beliefs.320 In
Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, the California plu-
rality cited these two cases to support its conclusion that the economic
burden on the landlord of abandoning the rental business was no more
onerous than the burden on Swaggert or Braunfeld.321
The California plurality distinguished Smith v. Fair Employment
& Housing Commission from Sherbert by noting that the degree of
compulsion in unemployment-compensation cases was greater than in
housing discrimination cases because the employees in unemployment
cases had to choose between adherence to their religious beliefs and
foregoing compensation altogether. 32 2 According to the plurality, the
landlord's livelihood was not similarly threatened because she could
simply sell her rental units and reinvest the money elsewhere. 3 23 The
plurality further attempted to distinguish the United States Supreme
Court unemployment cases by noting the absence of third party inter-
ests in those cases.3 24
Similarly, the Alaska Supreme Court determined in Swanner that
the marital status discrimination provision in the state's fair housing
law did not burden a religiously motivated landlord's free exercise
rights.3 25 The court reasoned that
the economic burden, or "Hobson's choice," of which [the landlord] complains,
is caused by his choice to enter into a commercial activity that is regulated by
anti-discrimination laws.... Voluntary commercial activity does not receive
the same status accorded to directly religious activity.... Because [the land-
lord's] religiously impelled actions trespass on the private right of unmarried
couples to not be unfairly discriminated against in housing, he cannot be
granted an exemption from the housing anti-discrimination laws.3 26
The substantial burden analysis in Smith v. Fair Employment &
Housing Commission and in Swanner is misguided for several rea-
sons. First, and most importantly, both courts muddle together the
substantial burden and compelling state interest tests. The impact of
the landlord's behavior on third parties is only relevant to determine
whether the state has shown it has a compelling interest in enforcing
the statute against the landlord. This impact is irrelevant to whether
a statute substantially burdens a landlord's free exercise rights.32 7 As
320. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 605-06 (1961).
321. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 926-27 (Cal.
1996)(plurality opinion).
322. See id. at 925.
323. See id.
324. See id. at 925-29.
325. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274 (Alaska 1994).
326. Id. at 283-84 (citations omitted).
327. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 947-48 (Cal.
1996)(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
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the label for the test suggests, the substantial burden inquiry is lim-
ited simply to ascertaining whether the law substantially burdens the
free exercise of the landlord's faith.32s If so, then the burden shifts to
the state to show a compelling interest and narrowly tailored
means.3 29 By mixing third party interests into the discussion of the
burden on the landlord's free exercise rights, each court improperly
shifted the burden of proof from the state to the landlord. Moreover,
this misapplication of the law enabled the California plurality in
Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission to avoid an honest
examination of whether the state could demonstrate a compelling in-
terest in protecting unmarried cohabitants. 33 0
The Swanner court similarly erred when it based its burden analy-
sis on a false dichotomy between commercial and religious activity.33 1
Quoting Lee, the court asserted that when religious people voluntarily
enter into commercial activity, they may not exalt their own religious
values above laws which regulate that commercial activity.3 32 How-
ever, the Lee court was not engaging in a substantial burden analysis
in the portion of the opinion quoted in Swanner.3 33 In fact, the
Supreme Court held that because the payment of social security taxes
and receipt of social security benefits violated Lee's religious beliefs,
compulsory participation in the social security system substantially
burdened his free exercise rights.33 4 After determining that the social
security system furthered a compelling governmental interest, the
Court decided that Lee's beliefs could not be accommodated without
undermining that interest. The language the Swanner court quoted
occurred at the end of Lee and had no bearing on the substantial bur-
den issue. 33 5
In Bowen v. Roy,336 the Supreme Court held that a Native Ameri-
can's religious beliefs were burdened by the requirement of welfare
applicants to supply social security numbers. No religious beliefs com-
pelled participation in the activities that created conflicts in Roy or
328. See supra notes 295-307 and accompanying text (explaining how the substantial
burden test focuses simply on whether the law burdens the objector's free exer-
cise rights).
329. See supra note 273.
330. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 929 & n.21 (Cal.
1996)(plurality opinion).
331. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283-84 (Alaska
1994).
332. See id. at 283.
333. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, Nos. 97-35220 & 97-35221, 1999
WL 11337, at *19 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999).
334. See United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 257 (1982).
335. See id. at 261.
336. 476 U.S. 693 (1986).
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Lee.3 37 Both believers could have avoided the conflict by abandoning
the activity. In both cases, the motivation for the activity was eco-
nomic gain, not religious observance, yet the Supreme Court held that
each of these conflicts resulted in a substantial burden on the be-
liever's religion which the government had to justify under the com-
pelling state interest test.338 As the Ninth Circuit recently stated, "In
none of [the Supreme Court's unemployment benefits] cases did the
Court entertain-much less credit-the argument that the religious
adherent could simply have left his job and have found an occupation
that better suited his religious beliefs and principles."3s 9 Given that
the landlord's religious objection to unmarried cohabitation is con-
trary to his pecuniary interests, 34 0 the conclusion that the state has
substantially burdened a religious objector's religious beliefs is even
more compelling in these landlord and tenant cases.
Second, the Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission
plurality's reliance on Braunfeld and Swaggert is misplaced. Neither
of those cases involved a government rule that required an objector to
violate his religious beliefs in order to engage in selected activity. In
other words, neither case presented a conflict between religious belief
and secular command that could only be resolved by abandoning the
objector's desired activity. In Braunfeld, the Sunday closing law did
not conflict with the Jewish shopkeepers' religious beliefs.341 The
shopkeepers could continue to observe the Sabbath on Saturday with-
out violating the law or abandoning their businesses. 34 2 Likewise, the
Court explained in Swaggert that the state sales tax simply increased
the cost of the ministry's activities but did not require ministry mem-
bers to violate their consciences in order to comply with the law:
There is no evidence... that collection and payment of the tax violates appel-
lant's sincere religious beliefs .... The only burden on appellant is the
claimed reduction in income resulting from the presumably lower demand for
337. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 946 (Cal.
1996)(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
338. See id. at 945.
339. Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, Nos. 97-35220 & 97-35221, 1999
WL 11337, at *20 (9th Cir. Jan 14, 1999).
340. See Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 238 (Mass. 1994)("The fact that
the [landlords free exercise of religion claim arises in a commercial context...
does not mean that their constitutional rights are not substantially burdened.
This is not a case in which a claimant is seeking a financial advantage by assert-
ing religious beliefs."); see also supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text (ex-
plaining how landlords have no economic incentive to exclude unmarried
cohabitants).
341. See Braunfeld v. Brown, 366 U.S. 599, 603-05 (1961).
342. See id. (explaining that a Sunday closing law does not infringe on a Sabbatarian's
freedom of belief); see also Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d
909, 948-49 (Cal. 1996)(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting)(distinguishing
Braunfeld on the grounds that nothing in the Jewish Orthodox religion compelled
Jewish shopkeepers to do that which the government prohibited).
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appellant's wares (caused by the marginally higher price) and from the costs
associated with administering the tax.3 4 3
By contrast, religious landlords who object to renting to unmarried
couples are forced to choose between religious belief and secular com-
mand. They must choose between obeying the law or abandoning the
rental market to avoid violating their religious convictions. 344 Forcing
landlords to make this choice imposes a substantial burden on their
free exercise rights. 34 5
Third, the Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission plu-
rality artificially distinguished the Supreme Court unemployment
cases and consequently trivialized the substantial coercion faced by
religious landlords. As Justice Kennard succinctly explained in her
separate opinion:
Smith is subject to greater, not less, coercion than those who follow their reli-
gious beliefs rather than their employers' demands. If they are fired and de-
nied unemployment benefits, they only lose a state subsidy of their
transaction costs in finding new employment. For following her religious be-
liefs.... Smith is subject to civil penalties, a cease-and-desist order dictating
her future conduct, and imprisonment.
Nor is the compulsion any less because ... Smith can sell her [properties
and redeploy her capital]. The employees in the unemployment benefits cases
... could have likewise sought other forms of employment that did not conflict
with their religious beliefs, . . . but that fact did not justify the denial of bene-
fits to them when they quit work for religious reasons. 3 4
6
Indeed, the Supreme Court in Sherbert explicitly rejected the argu-
ment that the indirect economic pressure from the state's denial of
unemployment benefits did not substantially burden the plaintiffs
free exercise rights: "In a sense the consequences of [being denied un-
employment benefits] may be only an indirect result of welfare legisla-
tion within the State's general competence to enact . . . but the
343. Jimmy Swaggert Ministries v. Board of Equalization, 493 U.S. 378, 391 (1990).
344. See Donahue v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 2 Cal. Rptr. 2d 32,42-44 (Ct.
App. 1991), review granted, 825 P.2d 766 (Cal. 1992), review dismissed, 859 P.2d
671 (Cal. 1993)(not published in official reporter and cannot be cited in Califor-
nia); Jasniowski v. Rushing, 678 N.E.2d 743, 749 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997), vacated on
other grounds, 685 N.E.2d 622 (Ill. 1997); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d
233, 237-38 (Mass. 1994); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 8 (Minn. 1990); see also
Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 949 (Cal. 1996)(Ken-
nard, J., concurring and dissenting)(distinguishing Swaggart); id. at 966-67 (Bax-
ter, J., dissenting)(distinguishing Braunfeld).
345. See generally Hobbie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 144
(1987); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 717-18 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner,
374 U.S. 398, 405-06 (1963). Hobbie, Thomas, and Sherbert all held that an em-
ployee's free exercise rights are substantially burdened where an employee is
forced to choose between fidelity to religious belief and continued employment.
346. Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 946 (Cal. 1996)(Ken-
nard, J., concurring and dissenting)(citation omitted); see also Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, Nos. 97-35220 & 97-35221, 1999 WL 11337, at
*20-21 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999)(quoted at supra note 339 and accompanying text).
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pressure upon her to forego [the] practice [of her religion] is
unmistakable. 3 4 7
The substantial burden analyses in Swanner and in Smith v. Fair
Employment & Housing Commission are result-oriented and poorly
reasoned. The Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission
plurality goes to great, intellectually dishonest lengths to avoid re-
quiring the state to show a compelling governmental interest in pro-
tecting unmarried couples from housing discrimination. Even though
these opinions appear troubling for landlords, the legal analysis is so
misguided that it is unlikely to persuade more astute, less politically
motivated judges. A law that requires landlords to rent to unmarried
couples undeniably imposes a substantial burden on the landlords'
free exercise rights. Accordingly, such a law should be subjected to
strict scrutiny review.3 48
V. STRICT SCRUTINY REVIEW
Regardless of how strict scrutiny review is triggered, whether
through the Federal Free Exercise Clause,3 4 9 the federal Establish-
ment Clause,3 50 or a state free exercise clause,3 5 ' this standard re-
quires the state to prove that the law in question furthers a
compelling governmental interest and is the least restrictive means of
furthering that interest.3 5 2
A. Compelling State Interest
The state must bear the traditionally heavy onus of proving a com-
pelling state interest. "[O]nly those interests of the highest order and
those not otherwise served can overbalance legitimate claims to the
free exercise of religion."3 53 The Supreme Court has shown that it
means what it says when it requires the state to prove interests "of the
highest order."3 5 4 "Only the gravest abuses, endangering paramount
347. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 403-04 (1963)(footnote omitted)(citation
omitted).
348. See Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 214-25 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S.
398, 403, 407-09 (1963).
349. See supra sections 1V-A.2.a & IV.B.
350. See supra section IV.A_2.b.
351. See supra section IV.C.
352. See Larson v. Valente, 456 U.S. 228, 246-47 (1982); Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S.
205, 214-15 (1972); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 407-09 (1963). As explained
in supra note 272, state courts have typically applied the Sherbert/Yoder strict
scrutiny analysis, or some close variation of it, when analyzing unique state free
exercise claims. The analysis in this section should be relevant under any state
free exercise test that applies.
353. Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205, 215 (1972).
354. Id.
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interest, give occasion for permissible limitation. 3 55 Even after Em-
ployment Division v. Smith, the Court has been clear that when strict
scrutiny applies, the compelling interest standard "is not 'water[ed]
... down' but 'really means what it says.'" 3 56 Thus, to meet this heavy
burden, the state may not simply postulate some general policy to sup-
port the law. Rather, the state must prove that the law is necessary to
meet an existing need of the highest order.3 57
The task before the state in this area of landlord and tenant law is
clear. In Attorney General v. Desilets,358 the Supreme Judicial Court
of Massachusetts rejected the state's naked assertion that its interest
in eliminating discrimination in housing justified forcing two devout
Roman Catholic landlords to violate their faith by renting to an un-
married couple. As the court explained:
The general objective of eliminating discrimination of all kinds . . . cannot
alone provide a compelling State interest that justifies the application of [the
fair housing law] in disregard of the defendants' right to free exercise of their
religion. The analysis must be more focused. At the least, the Commonwealth
must demonstrate that it has a compelling interest in the elimination of dis-
crimination in housing against an unmarried man and an unmarried woman
who have a sexual relationship and wish to rent accommodations to which
[the fair housing law] applies. 3 5 9
The court accordingly remanded the case for further proceedings to
allow the state to meet this burden of proof.36 0 Three justices dis-
sented, arguing that the state could not possibly demonstrate such a
compelling interest.3 6 1 The view of these dissenting justices proved to
be prescient. After the case was remanded, the state abandoned its
campaign against the landlords. 36 2
In all reported cases to date, no state actor has ever offered con-
crete proof to demonstrate a compelling state interest in providing un-
married couples with a right to live where they choose. In every case,
the state, taking the same position the court explicitly rejected in
Desilets, has simply asserted the need to eradicate discrimination
355. Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 406 (1963)(quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S.
516, 530 (1945))(emphasis added).
356. Church of the Lukumi Babalu Aye, Inc. v. City of Hialeah, 508 U.S. 520, 546
(1993)(quoting Employment Div. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 888 (1990)).
357. See, e.g., id. at 543-44 (rejecting the naked ipse dixits offered by the city to justify
its animal sacrifice law); Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981)(holding
that, although the justifications offered by the state to justify its law were facially
important, the state did not meet the compelling interest standard because there
was no evidence in the record to support those justifications).
358. 636 N.E.2d 233 (Mass. 1994).
359. Id. at 238.
360. See id. at 241.
361. See id. at 246-47 (O'Connor, J., joined by Nolan and Lynch, JJ., dissenting).
362. Telephone interview with the office of Jay Alan Sekulow, Chief General Counsel,
the American Center for Law and Justice, and counsel for Ronald and Paul
Desilets (February 18, 1998).
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against unmarried couples in housing.36 3 The Supreme Courts of
Alaska and Michigan stand alone in holding that the state meets its
burden of demonstrating a compelling interest by merely asserting a
need to eliminate such alleged discrimination.3 64 As the Alaska court
asserted, the state has a controlling "governmental interest in abolish-
ing improper discrimination[,] ... based on irrelevant characteris-
tics[,] ... that degrades individuals, affronts human dignity, and
limits one's opportunities ... ." 3 6 5
There are numerous flaws in the Alaska and Michigan courts' anal-
yses. The most fundamental flaw stems from the courts' failure to de-
mand that the state meet its burden of producing evidence that shows
an interest of the highest order that must be addressed by the state.
Naked ipse dixits are not enough to meet this burden.36 6 The
Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts, a progressive bench which
determined that landlords commit marital status discrimination by
not renting to unmarried couples, 3 67 correctly understood and applied
this principle:
Without supporting facts in the record or in legislative findings, we are
unwilling to conclude that simple enactment of the prohibition against dis-
crimination based on marital status establishes that the State has such a sub-
stantial interest in eliminating that form of housing discrimination that...
363. See, e.g., Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282-83
(Alaska 1994); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 929 &
n.21 (Cal. 1996)(plurality opinion); McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729
(Mich. 1998); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 9-11 (Minn. 1990).
364. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282-83 (Alaska
1994); McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Mich 1998).
365. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Alaska 1994);
see also McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Mich 1998). The plurality in
Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission expressed a similar view by
noting that the state must protect "the rights of [the] prospective tenants to have
equal access to public accommodations and their legal and dignity interests in
freedom from discrimination based on personal characteristics." Smith v. Fair
Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 925 (Cal. 1996)(plurality opinion).
However, the plurality referred to this alleged state interest while incorrectly an-
alyzing the substantial burden issue. See supra notes 315-348 and accompanying
text. In fact, because it held there was no substantial burden on the landlord's
religious beliefs, the plurality found it unnecessary to engage in a compelling in-
terest analysis. See supra note 330 and accompanying text. A lower Illinois court
essentially agreed with Swanner but the Supreme Court of Illinois vacated that
decision. See Jasniowski v. Rushing, 678 N.E.2d 743, 751 (Ill. App. Ct. 1997),
vacated, 685 N.E.2d 622 (IMl. 1997).
366. See supra notes 352-57 and accompanying text; see also Swanner v. Anchorage
Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 286 (Alaska 1994)(Moore, C.J., dissent-
ing)(quoting Frank v. Alaska, 694 P.2d 1068, 1070 (Alaska 1979))(explaining that
the state must show "that cohabiting couples have experienced hardship in find-
ing available housing, i.e., that [the landlord's] conduct poses a 'substantial
threat to public safety, peace or order.'").
367. See Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 235 (Mass. 1994).
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the substantial burden on the defendants' free exercise of religion must be
disregarded.3 6
8
In their apparent zeal to rule for the unmarried couple, the Alaska
and Michigan courts completely disregarded controlling principles of
law. The state cannot establish a compelling state interest without
offering any evidence to support it.
Second, the Alaska court 36 9 erroneously assumed that a landlord
who refuses on religious grounds to rent to unmarried couples dis-
criminates "based on irrelevant characteristics." 37 0 As explained ear-
lier, a landlord like Swanner does not discriminate based on an
irrelevant characteristic but simply objects to the prospective tenants'
conduct.3 71 Indeed, these landlords will not allow anyone, regardless
of that person's marital status, to engage in sex with someone other
than that person's spouse on the landlord's property.
Third, even if the landlord's behavior could be considered status-
based discrimination, there is no evidence that such discrimination is
so common it constitutes a significant state interest.3 72 To the con-
trary, complaints against landlords for refusing to rent to unmarried
couples are extremely rare. 37 3 This is not surprising given that land-
lords have no economic incentive to exclude such a large group of pro-
spective tenants.37 4 As Justice Kennard explained in her separate
opinion in Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission, unmar-
ried cohabitants were relatively rare until the 1960s. 37 5 Once they
appeared in significant numbers, they became socially accepted, and
"whatever housing and employment barriers existed for them crum-
bled rapidly and almost completely."3 76 Justice Kennard noted one
commentator's argument that
California authorities . . . [do not mention] any evidence that unmarried
couples were actually having difficulty finding housing; without such evi-
368. Id. at 240.
369. The Michigan Supreme Court's analysis of the compelling state interest issue
was cursory and shallow. See McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Mich.
1998). Thus, the remainder of the discussion of this issue in this section responds
only to the Alaska court's more detailed analysis.
370. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282-83 (Alaska
1994).
371. See supra section II.B.1.
372. The discussion that follows overlaps in many respects with the analysis in Part
III, supra, of whether the state may exercise its police power to favor unmarried
couples in the rental market. However, it is important to remember that
although the landlord bears the burden of prevailing on a police power challenge,
the state must meet the heavy burden of establishing a compelling state interest.
See supra notes 352-57 and accompanying text.
373. See supra notes 112-19 and accompanying text.
374. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
375. See Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 953 (Cal.
1996)(Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
376. Id.
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dence, this claim of compelling interest is utterly frivolous. The stakes are
entirely symbolic: sex outside marriage has gone from misdemeanor to com-
pelling interest in one generation, and religious believers who resist the
change must be crushed.3 7
7
Fourth, even if the state could somehow show that unmarried
couples have significant problems finding housing due to status-based
discrimination, eradicating this type of discrimination is not a para-
mount interest of the highest order. Only in cases of racial, ethnic or
gender discrimination has the Supreme Court recognized the preven-
tion of discrimination as an interest compelling enough to justify re-
strictions on constitutional rights.378 Discrimination against
unmarried couples is completely unlike the racial, ethnic and gender
discrimination that has plagued this country.37 9 Justice Thomas ex-
plained this point well in his dissenting opinion to the Supreme
Court's denial of a writ of certiorari in Swanner.3 80 Discussing Bob
Jones University v. United States,38 ' Justice Thomas explained that
the interest in eliminating racial discrimination in that case was com-
pelling because "every pronouncement of this Court and myriad Acts
of Congress and Executive Orders attest a firm national policy to pro-
hibit racial segregation and discrimination in public education."3 82
Justice Thomas noted that, by contrast, there has been no firm na-
tional policy against marital status discrimination. For this reason,
the Supreme Court and the courts of appeals have never accorded
marital status classifications any heightened scrutiny under Equal
Protection Clause jurisprudence.3 8 3 In fact, states routinely practice
marital status discrimination in other areas of the law, such as laws
governing intestate succession, insurance, worker's compensation,
377. Id. (quoting Douglas Laycock & Oliver S. Thomas, Interpreting the Religious
Freedom Restoration Act, 73 Tsx. L. REv. 209, 223-24 (1994))(alteration in
orginal).
378. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, Nos. 97-35220 & 97-35221, 1999
WL 11337, at *21-22 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999).
379. See Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 239 (Mass. 1994)(noting that mar-
ital status discrimination is not as intense a concern as discrimination based on
other classifications but remanding for further factual findings regarding
whether the state could show a compelling interest); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d
2, 10 (Minn. 1990)(holding that eradicating discrimination against unmarried
couples is not a compelling state interest because such discrimination is neither
invidious nor pervasive).
380. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 513 U.S. 979 (1994)(Thomas,
J., dissenting).
381. 461 U.S. 574 (1983).
382. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 513 U.S. 979, 981 (1994)(Thomas,
J., dissenting)(quoting Bob Jones Univ. v. United States, 461 U.S. 574, 593
(1983)).
383. See id. (citing Smith v. Shalala, 5 F.3d 235, 239 (7th Cir. 1993)); Thomas v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, Nos. 97-35220 & 97-35221, 1999 WL 11337, at
*22 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999).
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and privileged communications. 38 4 Moreover, the Supreme Court has
approved bestowing rights on married couples that are not given to
unmarried couples by recognizing a substantive due process right to
live with relatives but refusing to extend that right to unrelated indi-
viduals. 38 5 As Yale Law Professor Stephen L. Carter explained while
criticizing the holding in Swanner and the plurality opinion in Smith
v. Fair Employment & Housing Commission:
Now, let us agree, for the sake of argument, that it generally is wrong to
discriminate against couples on the basis of marital status. On the other
hand, in a nation facing a moral crisis sufficiently acute that each politician
falls over the next to insist on the value of the traditional family, it is far from
ridiculous, and certainly it is not invidious, to offer some forms of preferential
treatment for married couples. In fact, nearly every state, including every
state that bans discrimination on the basis of marital status, has some policies
that grant to married couples benefits that are denied to everybody else. Does
this simply show a foolish inconsistency that need not long detain us? I think
not: I think it shows that the states themselves do not believe that their inter-
est in banning discrimination on the basis of marital status is compelling.
More important, to conclude that discrimination on the basis of marital
status is as compelling as discrimination on the basis of race is to trivialize
our nation's ... racial histor[y] .... 386
In Swanner, the court attempted to distinguish the state's own acts
of marital status discrimination in other areas of the law:
The dissent attempts to prove that the state does not view marital status
discrimination in housing as a pressing problem by pointing to other areas in
which the state itself discriminates based on marital status. However, those
areas are easily distinguished. The government's interest here is in specifi-
cally eliminating marital status discrimination in housing, rather than elimi-
nating marital status discrimination in general. Therefore, other policies
which allow marital status discrimination are irrelevant ... 387
The inconsistency and circularity of the court's analysis is breathtak-
ing. Earlier, the court had specifically classified the state's interest as
"preventing individual acts of discrimination based on irrelevant char-
acteristics."38 8 There, the court essentially claimed that discrimina-
tion against unmarried couples is invidious in any context. If such
discrimination is truly invidious, it is always wrong. The state cannot
384. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 513 U.S. 979, 982
(1994)(Thomas, J., dissenting); Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 239-40
(Mass. 1994); State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 10 (Minn. 1990); see also Swanner v.
Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 289 (Alaska 1994)(Moore, C.J.,
dissenting); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 952 (Cal.
1996) (Kennard, J., concurring and dissenting).
385. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, Nos. 97-35220 & 97-35221, 1999
WL 11337, at *23 (9th Cir. Jan. 14, 1999)(citing Moore v. City of East Cleveland,
431 U.S. 494, 498 (1977)).
386. Carter, supra note 6, at 1650-51.
387. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 283 (Alaska 1994).
388. Id. at 282.
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claim that stamping out a form of private discrimination is an interest
of the highest order when the state engages in the very same conduct.
The Alaska court responded by suggesting that the state must treat
married couples differently from unmarried couples to avoid fraudu-
lent claims for benefits available only to spouses.3 89 The court did not
even pause to consider why such benefits should be available only to
spouses if the eradication of discrimination against unmarried couples
is a paramount state interest. If the eradication of marital status dis-
crimination is truly a compelling governmental interest akin to the
interest in eradicating racial or gender discrimination, then it must
necessarily be eradicated from all areas of society and the law.
Trapped by its own logic, the best defense the Swanner court could
muster was to repudiate its own earlier statement and to redefine the
interest in the narrowest terms possible. In a clear sleight of hand,
the court changed the interest from generally eliminating discrimina-
tion based on irrelevant characteristics, to eliminating only marital
status discrimination in housing.390 By so doing, the court contra-
dicted itself and also employed circular reasoning. The issue is
whether the state has a compelling interest in requiring religious
landlords to rent to unmarried couples. The Alaska court held that
the state has such an interest because elimination of marital status
discrimination in housing is necessary. This is like saying that the
state must criminalize lying because there is a compelling interest in
the elimination of lying. The very interest scrutinized justifies itself.
Needless to say, this is hardly the stuff of strict scrutiny.
Moreover, by narrowing the interest to housing, the Alaska court
suggests that prospective tenants have a right to the rental housing of
their choice.39i However, the Supreme Court has explicitly rejected
choice of housing as a fundamental right.39 2 Moreover, neither the
common law nor the Constitution provides such a right.39 3 The right
to housing of one's choice can only exist as a matter of legislative
389. See id. at 283.
390. Compare Swarmer v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282
(Alaska 1994)("he government possesses two interests here: a "derivative" inter-
est in ensuring access to housing for everyone, and a "transactional" interest in
preventing individual acts of discrimination based on irrelevant characteristics.")
(emphasis added) with id. at 283 (The government's interest here is in specifi-
cally eliminating marital status discrimination in housing, rather than eliminat-
ing marital status discrimination in general.").
391. See id. at 283; see also Smith v. Fair Employment and Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d
909, 925 (Cal. 1996)(plurality opinion) (referring to "the rights of... prospective
tenants to have equal access to public accommodations"); Jasniowski v. Rushing,
678 N.E.2d 743, 751 (1l. App. Ct. 1997)(referring to the "universal interest of
Chicago residents in available housing"), vacated, 685 N.E.2d 622 (M. 1997).
392. See Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 73-74 (1972); see also supra note 125 and
accompanying text.
393. See supra notes 124-26 and accompanying text.
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grace. 39 4 Once again, the Swanner court's logic is circular. The right
that was first created in the statute cannot provide the compelling in-
terest that justifies the state's enactment of the statute. Moreover,
the court's suggestion that the right to rental housing is more impor-
tant to the general public than employee benefits and inheritance laws
is curious at best.
Justice Thomas offered a surgically precise summation of this issue
in his dissenting opinion to the Court's denial of a writ of certiorari in
Swanner:
If, despite affirmative discrimination by Alaska on the basis of marital sta-
tus and a complete absence of any national policy against such discrimination,
the State's asserted interest in this case is allowed to qualify as a "compelling"
interest-that is, a "paramount" interest, an interest "of the highest order"-
then I am at a loss to know what asserted governmental interests are not
compelling. The decision of the Alaska Supreme Court drains the word com-
pelling of any meaning and seriously undermines... protection for exercise of
religion .... 395
Justice Thomas is absolutely correct. The mere assertion of a need
to stamp out discrimination against unmarried couples in housing
cannot alone satisfy the state's burden of proving a compelling inter-
est. Rather, the state must, at a minimum, produce evidence showing:
1) historical and pervasive discrimination against unmarried couples;
2) the number of cohabiting couples and religiously motivated land-
lords; 3) the number of rental units not available because of the reli-
gious convictions of these landlords; 4) the length of time it takes to
find appropriate housing; and 5) the types of housing available to un-
married cohabitants as an alternative. 3 96 Only then can the state
meet its burden of showing a paramount interest in protecting unmar-
ried cohabitants. If the state does not meet this heavy burden, it can-
not justify forcing religious landlords to rent to unmarried couples.
B. Least Restrictive Means
Even if the state demonstrates a compelling interest, it must also
show that it could not advance this interest if religiously objecting
landlords were exempted from the law.39 7 The issue here is "whether
the rental housing policies of [religious objectors] can be accommo-
394. See Lindsey v. Normet 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972)("Absent constitutional mandate,
the assurance of adequate housing and the definition of landlord-tenant relation-
ships are legislative, not judicial, functions.").
395. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 513 U.S. 979, 982 (1994)(Thomas,
J., dissenting).
396. See Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 238-41 (Mass. 1994); Smith v. Fair
Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 952-53 (Cal. 1996)(Kennard, J.,
concurring and dissenting). The court in Desilets explained that the state must
analyze these variables in the locality of the alleged discrimination and not just
state-wide. See Desilets, 636 N.E.2d at 241.
397. See Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 (1981).
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dated . . . without significantly impeding the availability of rental
housing for people who are cohabiting or wish to cohabit."398 The
state must proffer evidence that exempting religious landlords would
lead to a shortage of housing for cohabiting unmarried couples. Mere
speculation that such a shortage might occur is not sufficient to meet
this burden of proof.3 9 9
No state has offered credible evidence to meet this burden, and it is
very unlikely that a state could ever do so. The current data shows
that religious landlords pose no tangible threat to the ability of un-
married couples to obtain housing.400 Nationwide, there are only
eight reported cases involving landlords who have decided for reli-
gious reasons not to rent to unmarried couples.4 0 ' Thus, the state has
no legitimate justification for refusing to exempt sincerely objecting
religious landlords from a law requiring those landlords to rent to un-
married couples.
Moreover, exempting religious landlords will provide no real incen-
tive for other landlords to register the same objection. These religious
beliefs are at odds with the landlords' economic interests. Market
forces discourage landlords from restricting the class of people to
whom they will rent. By excluding unmarried couples, religious land-
lords artificially reduce demand for their apartments and the rent
they can command.402 Landlords who are willing to restrict their
market unilaterally will then confront the risk of incurring potential
fines and penalties for violating the state's fair housing law.40 3 The
tension between the objecting landlords' religious beliefs and their
economic interests further reduces the possibility that exempting
them would seriously, or even appreciably, affect the housing market
for cohabiting couples.
This disincentive for landlords to exclude unmarried couples con-
trasts sharply with the incentive religious objectors have to claim
398. Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240 (Mass. 1994); see also Smith v.
Fair Employment Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 975 (Cal. 1996)(Baxter, J., dis-
senting)("There is nothing in the record to indicate the number of landlords [who
object on religious grounds to renting to unmarried cohabitants] is so great as to
cause a serious shortage of housing for unmarried couples.").
399. See, e.g., Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 835
(1989)(summarily rejecting the prophecy that "chaos would result" or that Sun-
day activities "will grind to a halt" if the religious objector's claim for benefits
were granted); see also Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 719 (1981)(noting
the absence of any evidence in the record to "indicate that the number of people
who find themselves in the predicament of choosing between benefits and reli-
gious beliefs is large enough to create widespread unemployment, or even to seri-
ously affect unemployment").
400. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
401. See supra notes 116-17 and accompanying text.
402. See supra notes 120-22 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 302-07 & 344-47 and accompanying text.
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some governmental entitlements, such as unemployment benefits.
Claimants for unemployment benefits have an obvious motivation to
lie about whether religious beliefs impair their ability to work. Yet,
the Supreme Court has consistently granted Sabbatarians exemptions
from complying with state unemployment benefit laws requiring work
on their Sabbath day.40 4
The state's burden of proving that a statute does not unnecessarily
infringe upon the rights of landlords will be even more difficult if, as in
several states, the fair housing law already provides some exemptions,
including those for religious organizations and landlords who live on
the premises or rent a limited number of units.40 5 Having explicitly
granted some exemptions, the state can hardly argue that exemptions
threaten the interest behind the law. Exemptions for religious organi-
zations and for landlords who live on the premises or who rent a lim-
ited number of units will protect a potentially large number of
citizens. Because the state has determined that granting these ex-
emptions would not impair any compelling interest, it can hardly ar-
gue that the same interest will be jeopardized if a relatively small
number of market-defying, religious landlords are exempted as
well.40 6 The evidence strongly suggests that religious landlords who
object to renting to unmarried cohabitants do not pose any threat to
state fair housing laws.40 7
Not surprisingly, the Supreme Court of Alaska nevertheless held
in Swanner that it could not grant a religious landlord an exemption
from the state fair housing law. As the court put it, the state had an
interest "in preventing acts of discrimination based on irrelevant char-
acteristics regardless of whether the prospective tenants ultimately
find alternative housing."40 8 Thus, the court concluded, Swanner
could not be granted an exemption because his "religiously impelled
actions trespass on the private right of unmarried couples to not be
unfairly discriminated against in housing."409
404. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't ofEmployment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832-35 (1989); Hob-
bie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 139-46 (1987); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 716-20 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410
(1963).
405. See supra notes 185-86 and accompanying text.
406. See Attorney Gen. v. Desilets, 636 N.E.2d 233, 240 (Mass. 1994)(any asserted
state interest is weakened by the fact that the state housing statute exempts
religious organizations).
407. See supra notes 111-19 and accompanying text.
408. Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282 (Alaska 1994).
409. Id. at 284; see also McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729 (Mich. 1998)(reach-
ing the same conclusion). Although this approach to narrow tailoring does not
prevail in any other jurisdiction, in Smith v. Fair Employment & Housing Com-
mission, a plurality of the California Supreme Court refused to grant the landlord
an exemption in part because it would "completely sacrific[e] the rights of the
prospective tenants not to be discriminated against by [the landlord] in housing
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No state has ever substantiated the premise that it has a compel-
ling interest in eliminating this alleged form of discrimination. 41 0
Nevertheless, even if the premise were sound, the opinion in Swanner
completely eviscerates the narrow tailoring test. Swanner essentially
held that the state prevails by merely asserting that its law protects a
public interest of the highest order.4 1i The narrow tailoring test re-
quires the state to prove additionally that the alleged interest, here
eliminating alleged discrimination against unmarried couples in
rental housing, could not be achieved without infringing on the free
exercise rights of landlords. It is certainly true that discrimination
cannot be completely eradicated unless no exemptions are allowed, but
if that were the test no exemptions would ever be allowed in any case.
The Alaska court improperly employed a "most effective means" test
rather than the "least restrictive means" test that actually applies.4 12
If the Supreme Court had applied this logic in its four unemploy-
ment benefits cases, it would have held that no exemptions could be
granted because the most effective way to assure that only legiti-
mately unemployed people receive benefits is to strictly enforce the
weekend work requirements. Rather than misapplying the narrow
tailoring standard in that way, the Court's decisions focused solely on
whether granting exemptions would substantially threaten the state's
goal of preventing unemployment. 41 3 By definition, if an exemption
can be granted only if it will have no impact on the state's proffered
accommodations on account of marital status." Smith v. Fair Employment and
Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 928 (Cal. 1996)(plurality opinion). As explained
earlier, the plurality incorrectly considered this argument as part of the substan-
tial burden inquiry. To the extent this point is relevant at all, it should be ad-
dressed as part of the narrow tailoring analysis. See supra notes 324-27 and
accompanying text.
410. See supra notes 327-30 and accompanying text.
411. See Swanner v. Anchorage Equal Rights Comm'n, 874 P.2d 274, 282-84 (Alaska
1994).
412. See id. at 280 n.9 ("[W]e hold. . . that compelling state interests support the
prohibitions on marital status discrimination. The most effective tool the state
has for combating discrimination is to prohibit discrimination.... Consequently,
the means are narrowly tailored and there is no less restrictive alternative.").
The Supreme Court of Michigan made a similar error of law when it held that
objecting religious landlords were not entitled to an exemption from the state fair
housing law because they could not "superimpose" their own beliefs on generally
applicable statutory schemes. See McCready v. Hoffius, 586 N.W.2d 723, 729
(Mich. 1998)(quoting United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 261 (1982)). If that
proposition is literally true, then the state will always prevail when it acts to
protect a compelling state interest and the least restrictive means test will be
irrelevant.
413. See Frazee v. Illinois Dep't of Employment Sec., 489 U.S. 829, 832-35 (1989); Hob-
bie v. Unemployment Appeals Comm'n, 480 U.S. 136, 139-46 (1987); Thomas v.
Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 713-20 (1981); Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398, 410
(1963).
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interest, then an exemption will never be granted and the narrow tai-
loring test will be pointless.
Given the Alaska court's propensity toward result-oriented reason-
ing, it is not surprising that it reached such a dubious conclusion on
narrow tailoring. When a court correctly applies this test, the state
will have a difficult burden to meet.4 14 Unless the state can show that
granting religious exemptions will undermine the purpose of the stat-
ute, the state must grant religious landlords an exemption. 4 15
VI. CONCLUSION
It should now be clear why this Article began by comparing the
"right" of unmarried cohabitants to the housing of their choice,
notwithstanding the sincere religious objections of their prospective
landlord, to the emperor's new clothes. The few courts that have
taken it upon themselves to create this right have done so only by
indulging vacuous assumptions at every turn. These courts have first
assumed that the legislature intended to protect unmarried couples in
housing transactions even though no statute explicitly does so. They
414. In a cursory opinion, the Supreme Court of Michigan mistakenly held that it
could not grant an exemption to two religious landlords because they "have pro-
vided no argument to convince us that the state could have accomplished its goal
of equal access to housing by less obtrusive means." McCready v. Hoffius, 586
N.W.2d 723, 729 (Mich. 1998). In addition to misunderstanding how the lest re-
strictive means test applies (see supra note 412), the court failed to appreciate
that the state, not the landlord, must bear the burden of proof on this issue. See
supra notes 352-62, 397-99 and accompanying text.
415. Some parties and commentators have argued that providing such an exemption
would violate the Establishment Clause. See Thomas v. Anchorage Equal Rights
Comm'n, Nos. 97-35220 & 97-35221, 1999 WL 11337, at *25-26 (9th Cir. Jan. 14,
1999); Smith v. Fair Employment & Hous. Comm'n, 913 P.2d 909, 929 n.21 (Cal.
1996) (plurality opinion) (noting but not addressing this contention); Markey, The
Price, supra note 6, at 815-17. This argument is mistaken. Since 1963, the
Supreme Court has held in several cases that religious objectors were entitled to
exemptions. See supra notes 154-68 and accompanying text. In Employment Di-
vision v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872 (1990), the Court retreated from its prior approach
to constitutionally mandated, generally available religious exemptions. See
supra notes 169-77 and accompanying text. However, the Court expressly sup-
ported the concept of the legislature providing such exemptions. See Smith, 494
U.S. at 890. As explained earlier, per se exemptions do not violate the Establish-
ment Clause, but only those that discriminate against particular religious beliefs.
See supra notes 192-224 and accompanying text; see also Fowler v. Rhode Island,
345 U.S. 67, 69-70 (1953)(holding that it was unconstitutional for a municipality
to prohibit Jehovah's Witnesses from preaching in a public park while allowing
preaching by Catholics and Protestants); Thomas, 1999 WL 11337, at *25-26
("Obviously, Free Exercise Clause exemptions do not as a general matter violate
the Establishment Clause .... The Establishment Clause does not forbid what
the Free Exercise Clause requires."). For the reasons explained in this Article,
the state should exempt all sincere religious objectors, regardless of their faith,
from having to violate their beliefs by renting to unmarried cohabitants.
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have assumed that a prohibition against "marital status discrimina-
tion" protects unmarried couples even though cohabitants do not com-
prise a unique marital status. They have further assumed that these
landlords discriminate against single people based on their status and
not their sexual conduct, even though the opposite is true. They have
further assumed the state is authorized to protect citizens who cur-
rently face no problems obtaining housing in the marketplace. By as-
suming that requiring landlords to violate their consciences is
irrelevant, they have trivialized the landlords' religious beliefs even
though those beliefs are firmly rooted in historic Judeo-Christian prin-
ciples. They have trivialized the importance of racial equality and
religious liberty with the facile assumption that protecting unmarried
cohabitation is an interest of the highest order, rivaling the need to
eradicate racial and ethnic discrimination and exceeding the need to
protect religious liberty. They have rationalized away the states' his-
tories of uniformly refusing to extend to unmarried cohabitants bene-
fits that married couples enjoy. Finally, they have assumed that, even
though few religious landlords have been willing to incur the state's
wrath by not renting to unmarried couples, scores of unmarried cohab-
itants will be left homeless if the state grants religious landlords ex-
emptions from this new, judicially-created right. They have made all
of these assumptions without one shred of evidence to support them.
There can be little doubt about the true agenda here, although only
one judge has clearly admitted it. Chief Justice Popovich of the Min-
nesota Supreme Court issued a strongly-worded dissent in State v.
French.4 16 In defending his belief that the landlord had committed
marital status discrimination by excluding a "supposedly immoral
couple,"4 17 Chief Justice Popovich stated that "[rieligious and moral
values include not discriminating against others solely because of
their color, sex, or whom they live with, avoiding unnecessary emo-
tional suffering, showing tolerance for nontraditional lifestyles, and
treating others as one would wish to be treated."4 18 Justice Popovich
went on to conclude that "[tihere is nothing inherently suspect about
two unmarried people of the opposite.., sex living together. 41 9
Although this type of judicial activism, particularly in the realm of
religious beliefs, is alarming,42o at least Chief Justice Popovich admit-
ted what is obviously behind this movement to favor unmarried
couples in rental disputes. The jurists and commentators who support
416. 460 N.W.2d 2, 11-21 (1990)(Popovich, C.J., dissenting).
417. Id at 17.
418. Id.
419. Id at 18.
420. "If there is any fixed star in our constitutional constellation, it is that no official,
high or petty, can prescribe what shall be orthodox in... religion... or force
citizens to confess by word or act their faith therein." West Virginia Bd. of Educ.
v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 642 (1943).
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this minority trend in the law clearly believe there is nothing wrong
with fornication and unmarried cohabitation,421 and they want the
state to punish those who sincerely disagree with them.
Few would argue with Justice Popovich's suggestion that it is
wrong to discriminate based on immutable characteristics4 2 2 and that
it is desirable to live by the "golden rule."423 People can, however,
legitimately disagree about standards of sexual morality. These land-
lords simply want to rent their property without violating their con-
science. They do not ask these unmarried couples to stop living
together. They simply wish not to become morally implicated in what
they sincerely consider sinful behavior. The issue for the courts is not
whether the landlords' beliefs are correct. The issue is whether the
state should respect the right of the landlords to act on these beliefs
rather than effectively force the landlords to violate them.
Instead of allowing both sides to exercise their beliefs freely, the
proponents of unmarried cohabitation insist on using the power of the
state to force religious landlords to tacitly condone their sexual ethics.
These proponents likely would applaud the state's decision to
decriminalize fornication and unmarried cohabitation because it is
wrong for the state to impose one set of moral standards. As the say-
ing goes, sauce for the goose is sauce for the gander. If the state
should not enact laws that impose one set of moral standards regard-
ing the propriety of private, consensual sexual conduct, then it like-
wise should not enact laws that impose the countervailing set of moral
standards. Ironically, these proponents often claim to esteem "toler-
ance" for others.424 Apparently, their tolerance does not extend to the
beliefs of people who sincerely disagree with them regarding the mo-
rality of fornication and unmarried cohabitation.
The master weavers have deceived us! The emperor is naked! In-
deed, they have to some degree, and he certainly is.
421. See, e.g., Markey, The Price, supra note 6, at 702, 752, 822 (referring to the belief
that fornication is immoral as "religious zealotry," "atavistic" and "arbitrary").
422. See, e.g., Leviticus 19:15 (New International Version)(Do not pervert justice; do
not show partiality to the poor or favoritism to the great, but judge your neighbor
fairly."); Galatians 3:28 (New International Version)("There is neither Jew nor
Greek, slave nor free, male nor female, for you are all one in Christ Jesus."):
James 2:1-13 (instructing Christians not to show favoritism based on wealth or
social status).
423. See, e.g., Leviticus 19:18 (New International Version)(Iove your neighbor as your-
self'); Matthew 7:12 (New International Version)("In everything do to others
what you would have them do to you, for this sums up the Law and the
Prophets.").
424. See, e.g., State v. French, 460 N.W.2d 2, 15 (Minn. 1990)(Popovich, C.J.,
dissenting).
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